



PROTECTING AID FUNDS IN UNSTABLE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTS:
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY

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Empirical Evidence on the Impact of EU Democracy Assistance

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Chapter One

CONNECTING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION & PROTECTION WITH THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

In the early 1980s, a novel “international policy industry” was born. It subsequently expanded rapidly and almost monotonically over the next two decades. We have labeled this growth industry: Democracy Promotion & Protection (DPP), and the purpose of this volume is to evaluate its impact in two regional contexts: (1) upon the liberalization of autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and (2) upon the consolidation of democratic regimes in Central & Eastern Europe (CEE).

In the financial magnitude of resources expended and in the geo-cultural spread of countries involved, DPP has involved an unprecedented effort. While in strictly money terms it engaged only a relatively small proportion of the total of public and private policy-driven transfers from donor to recipient countries – ten percent seems to be the rough figure – this was still much larger than in the past. Moreover, at the level of public discourse, DPP became a very prominent theme, at times eclipsing the previous emphasis on economic development, social equity or political stability. Transfers from the established to the deserving in the name of democracy were justified in terms of their contribution to domestic growth and international peace, rather than *vice versa*.

Even more surprising than the donors’ enthusiastic embrace of these objectives has been the way in which they were received. Whereas before such manifest intrusions by foreigners would have been rejected on the grounds of unwarranted “interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state,” DPP has not only been willingly (if sometimes grudgingly) accepted in the case of regime liberalization, but it was even actively encouraged by elites seeking to consolidate democracy. As we shall see, this is especially puzzling since *a priori* the assumption has always been that attempts at regime consolidation in general and democratic regime consolidation in particular were uniquely autochthonous matters, heavily overlaid with national symbols and domestic calculations and, therefore, such manifest intrusions by foreigners could only diminish the chance of success.

But, first, a bit of historical perspective. In both its principles and its practices, political democracy has long been an object of international diffusion. All regimes that claim to be democratic have proclaimed a permanent national interest in having other regimes adopt similar rules and ideals – even if they have done little explicitly to promote or protect such an outcome and have, not infrequently, supported autocratic regimes when it suited their other national interests. Particular events, such as revolutions conducted in the name of democracy, and choices of rules concocted to implement it in a particular country have spread from one site to another, although again this was only rarely the subject of deliberate effort. One can invoke the images of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine in the *salons* of Eighteenth Century Europe, but that was hardly a concerted policy initiative of the new American Republic. Moreover, such diffusion was strictly limited by spatial and cultural boundaries. For example, the first real “wave of democratization” – the so-called Spring-time of Freedom (1848-52) – started in Naples and diffused quickly to neighboring countries on the continent, but had little effect across the Atlantic or even across the Channel (although it did get as far north as Denmark). Subsequent waves associated with World Wars One and Two involved a widening circle of affected countries and more explicit recourse to policies of DPP. The former involved attempts at democratizing the newly independent units of the former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. International supervision of plebiscites, as well as approval of constitutional guarantees of minority rights by the League of Nations, was part of that effort. The latter wave leaped across several oceans to produce regime change within units of European empires in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. In virtually every case, the former imperial power was itself a (more-or-less) successfully established democracy and sought to transfer its institutions to newly independent former colonies. The role of the newly created United Nations was limited to supervising the transfer of authority in protectorates under its mandate. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. India, Botswana, Jamaica and some other Caribbean islands, plus a few Pacific mini-states), this most recent precursor of DPP was not a success. Most of the transplanted institutions failed to take root and many were subsequently

rejected on the grounds that they were antithetic to cultural norms and popular aspirations.

The bottom-line of this short historical *excursus* is that, while it is true that democracy has always been an international subject of discourse and object of policy, it is also true that relatively little was done **deliberately** and **specifically** to promote or protect democracy across national borders until recently. And the evolutionary trends were hardly favorable for DPP. As the practice of citizenship expanded to include forms of equality beyond the strictly legal and political, democracy itself become inevitably more “national” and discriminatory with regard to “non-nationals.” Disparities emerged between the rights and entitlements of persons in particular countries and this inhibited exchanges of international pressure and solidarity from below, at the same time that a tightening system of inter-state alliances (and national neutralities) made cooperative action at the top more difficult. As the well-worn saying goes, “democracies have not gone to war with each other,” but they also did relatively little to help each other become or remain democratic – unless it was clearly in their national security interests to do so. And, even then, intervention ostensibly to make “(country X) ... safe for democracy” did not always turn out so favorably: *vide* Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, South Korea and South Vietnam -- not to mention, innumerable cases in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A THEORY VACUUM

Perhaps, this dismal historical record helps to explain why, when the practice of DPP began in earnest in the early 1980s, it was so devoid of any theoretical backing. In striking contrast to the initiation of foreign economic aid to Third World countries in the 1960s and 1970s that came fully equipped with an (at the time) widely respected set of justifying concepts (*viz.* the “take-off to self-sustained growth”) and an expanding professional cadre of “development economists,” one looks in vain for any serious attempt to ground DPP policies in existing theories of democracy or democratization.

The obvious reason is not that there were no such theories available or in the making. And if practitioners had dared to take seriously what scholars had written on

the subject (and had managed to shift through their inevitable *querelles de famille*), they could only have drawn a negative lesson:

Do not intervene directly in the internal affairs of a fledgling democracy! Either you will have little or no impact since virtually all these countries lack the elementary “prerequisites” that have been necessary in the past, or you will not know what to do since success in this highly uncertain enterprise depends on contingent power relations within a relative small subset of actors inside the country.

Had they listened to the prevailing orthodoxy in academe at the time, DPP practitioners would have been strongly encouraged to act indirectly (if they had to do so at all) by promoting the allegedly indispensable economic or cultural conditions that make stable liberal democracy possible. In other words, “Go back to what you were doing before, if only in a more focused and selective fashion by rewarding those countries that were at least trying to change from autocracy to democracy, but have no illusions.” Democracy-building is a very lengthy and largely autochthonous process. All that established democracies can do directly is to cultivate their image of material and ethical superiority and hope that those who are less economically and culturally fortunate will eventually get the message and revolt against their authoritarian/totalitarian rulers – unless, thanks to highly unusual conditions of international insecurity, these democracies are willing to go to war, are capable of defeating their autocratic opponents and then motivated enough to occupy them for a protracted period of time. Postwar Germany, Austria and Japan demonstrated that this could be done successfully, but then these countries already had many of the allegedly indispensable economic, if not cultural, requisites before undergoing externally induced and protractedly applied regime changes.

Had those practitioners eager to engage in *DPP* bothered to read the emerging literature on democratization that subsequently became labeled as “transitology,” they might have been slightly more encouraged. Here, the emphasis shifted from probabilistic analyses of what had been associated with the advent of liberal political democracy in the past to “possibilistic speculations” about what actors might do in the

present to come up with (i.e. “to craft”) mutually acceptable rules for channeling political conflict into competition between their parties, associations and movements. This strategic rather than the structural conception of the process of regime change quite explicitly did not mention the importance of material or cultural requisites and, therefore, implied that efforts to democratize in “unfavorable” settings were not *a priori* doomed to fail. However, had they read a bit further, advocates of DPP would have learned that such “possibilism” placed a high priority on **domestic** elites, whether they were incumbent authoritarians or challenging democrats. In the exaggerated uncertainty of transition, only those with “local knowledge” of rapidly changing interests and with “credible capacity” to deliver the compliance of some key group stood much of a chance of making a positive contribution – and these are precisely the qualities that foreign DPP experts are least likely to have! Only once the transition was over and reversion to autocracy more-or-less excluded would politics begin to settle into more predictable behaviors that reflected (and reproduced) pre-existing patterns of socio-economic inequality and cultural differentiation. In that subsequent process of “consolidation” or “institutionalization,” foreigners with their various programs of democracy assistance might have a more important role to play, but by then the range of probable outcomes would have narrowed considerably. Many if not most of the crucial decisions would have already been made. The most that DPP could reasonably expect was to make a marginal contribution, more to the type and quality of democracy than to its emergence or persistence.

The DPP industry seems to have been blissfully unaware of either of these “schools” and to have gone ahead on a more practical and immediate basis. Their slogan seems to have been: “these people are (or should be) trying to democratize their respective national regimes and we (well-established democrats) should help them” – even if behind these public proclamations may have lurked some, less other-regarding, motives. The fact that such a policy tended to funnel additional resources into donor agencies that already existed to promote economic and (sometimes) military aid certainly made the choice to intervene initially more palatable. Subsequently, it galvanized into action a wide range of non-governmental organizations – many of which

took advantage of the “sub-contracting” opportunities offered by national and, in the case of Europe, supra-national authorities.

Timing seems also to have played an important role. It is very important to observe that DPP began in earnest in the early 1980s – **before** not **after** the fall of the Wall and the end of the Cold War. These events at the very end of this decade no doubt gave an additional impetus to the policy, but they cannot be assigned initial responsibility for it. One should not forget that the very first case of democratization in this most recent wave occurred under very special circumstances. The Portuguese *Revolução dos Cravos* in 1974 sent the (in retrospect, erroneous) message that regime change from protracted authoritarian rule was going to be a tumultuous process. Not only might it be associated with aspirations for radical forms of “popular power” and expansion in the role of the state, but it might also call into question well-established international alliances and, therefore, endanger the external security of existing liberal democracies. The events in Portugal were not only unexpected, but they caught these powers without an *instrumentarium* for dealing with such a threat (with the notable exception of the German party foundations and usual deployment of national intelligence services).

Ronald Reagan’s famous speech before the British House of Commons in 1982 has been widely and rightly regarded as “the kick-off event” for DPP. The Council of Europe had a long-standing commitment to democratization that it implemented through its own membership requirements and a growing network of treaties. The German party foundations – Friedrich Ebert, Konrad Adenauer and Friedrich Naumann, at the time – were also active with aid to “sister parties” and the sponsorship of academic encounters in countries with authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes. But it was not until the Americans entered the arena aggressively in the early 1980s that DPP can be said to have begun *in serio*.

And when they did so, they were unequivocally motivated by the desire to prevent experiences such as that of Portugal and those that were just beginning to emerge in Latin America from upsetting the international balance of power and/or producing types of democracy that would be much less compatible with American economic interests. It is not too much of an exaggeration to claim that their interest in

democracy was secondary to their concern with containing the spread of the “evil empire” and, not coincidentally, insuring the health and welfare of capitalism. Had it not been for two quite unexpected developments and one lucky guess, DPP might never have attained its subsequent prominence. It would have been (accurately) perceived as just another weapon in the American arsenal of anti-communism (and a relatively minor one at that). Europeans at that time were experimenting with various forms of *Ostpolitik* and would certainly have distanced themselves from the endemic excesses that have plagued such policies in the past: the Manichean vision of politics divided into “good guys” and “bad guys;” the tendency to support right-wing and sometimes even reactionary political groups; the propensity to confuse “free politics” with “free markets;” and, of course, the unwillingness to admit that the enemy itself might be changing.

The first development was the discovery that democratization might not be such a tumultuous process of change as was implied by the Portuguese Revolution and subsequently reinforced by the Philippine experience with “People Power.” The specter of radical popular democracy proved to be a mirage. In case after case, domestic groups struggling against autocracy rather quickly came to realize that, whatever eventual changes might be forthcoming in property relations, income inequality or social justice, the route to attaining them passed through – rather than around or on top of – the limited and prosaic procedures of institutionalizing “liberal political democracy.” The lessons of Cuba, Nicaragua and other abortive revolutionary or populist breakthroughs had been learned and were not going to be repeated in the post-1974 wave of democratization that began in Southern Europe and then moved on to South America and Asia.

The second development was the *divine surprise* of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. Not only did this manifestly knock the props out from under the whole edifice of anti-communism, but it also vindicated the European strategy of “constructive engagement.” Moreover, it virtually doubled the number of potential recipients of DPP overnight. Deprived of their enemy and overwhelmed by the demands of their new friends, the American architects of DPP seized the opportunity to intervene, although interestingly they emphasized the absolute priority of economic over political reform. Presumably, this reflected their primary

underlying goal since it was by dismantling the structure of economic management and state ownership that the communist system would be most irrevocably destroyed, not just by decreeing the end of single party rule and introducing competitive political institutions. They also prudently "off-loaded" the operational responsibility for many specific DPP programs in Eastern Europe to a "consortium" run predominantly by Europeans and channeled through the European Community (later Union).

The "lucky guess" was that the more optimistic "strategic and possibilistic" theories of democratization turned out to be better descriptors and predictors of the process of regime change and its outcome than were the more pessimistic "structural and probabilistic" ones. Country after country that should have been condemned to immediate failure and regression to autocracy somehow managed to craft its way through the transition and many have already made substantial progress toward consolidating a mutually acceptable set of rules for competition between political groups, rotation in power and some degree of accountability of rulers. DPP promoters were probably ignorant of this underlying academic controversy, but they could not help but notice that even some countries as initially unpromising as Bolivia, Mongolia, Nepal and Romania did not succumb to the temptations of "heroic leadership" or "populist power." Whatever the actual impact of their various programs for the organization and observation of elections, the promotion of civil society, the enhancement of the independence of the judiciary or the rule of law, etc., these efforts were only rarely associated with manifest regime collapse. Even with the, by now habitual, references to the low-quality of the democracies that have been crafted under these conditions, there can be no denying that the strategic choices of actors have made a difference – and, this leaves open the possibility (but does not prove) that external democracy promoters and protectors could have contributed positively to that unprecedentedly successful outcome.

THIRTEEN SKEPTICAL PROPOSITIONS ABOUT DPP

For the reasons mentioned above, DPP seems to be one of those topics in which theory and practice are unusually difficult to combine successfully. With very few

exceptions, those who reflect in a generalizable and comparative way about attempts by outsiders to guide and improve the process of democratization seem destined to be skeptical about the effort. Conversely, with few exceptions, those “foreign agents” involved in designing and implementing policies of DPP tend to complain that “abstract theoreticians” are insensitive to their practical problems and, hence, that their efforts are not properly appreciated. Most of the time, however, the former do not waste much serious research time and effort on what they see as naïve and misguided policies; the latter do not even bother to read attentively such irrelevant scribblings – and, when they do, they complain that the theoreticians adopt contrary perspectives and do not provide clear and compelling guidelines for action.

As card-carrying members of the “theory party,” we cannot pretend to resolve this intrinsic clash of perspectives – not even to present a balanced view on the issue. The best we can offer is a set of skeptical propositions suggested by the literature on democratization that focuses on why DPP is such a difficult and paradoxical activity, whose impact may only rarely correspond to the “good intentions” of its practitioners.

1. The net contribution of DPP can be potentially significant (and positive), but it is rarely more than marginal in determining the outcome of democratization.
2. The very existence of DPP is normally voluntary and reciprocal in principle, but is almost always semi- to in-voluntary and asymmetric in practice.
3. The presence of DPP in a given country usually involves a formal contractual arrangement between public authorities, but its performance is largely contingent upon informal relations between non-governmental organizations and private persons.
4. The epistemological basis of DPP is the presumed superiority of well-established liberal democracies, and yet democracy in these donor countries is often in serious crisis – and precisely in those aspects that they are most insistent on transferring to recipients, i.e., electoral politics and competitive parties.

5. The success of DPP is intrinsically problematic and long term (not to mention, marginal in impact), and yet donors require repeated evidence of immediate, visible and significant accomplishments in order to ensure continuous support from their citizens/taxpayers for DPP.
6. The success of DPP is likely to be greater where it is least needed and, hence, the tendency for donors to “cherry-pick” by concentrating their effort on those countries where liberalization or democratization would have occurred anyway.
7. Inversely, the success of DPP is likely to be greater when the desire of donors to provide it is weakest, i.e. when it is not used as a “cover” for the pursuit of other donor objectives such as national security or commercial advantage.
8. The institutional transfer inherent in DPP is often the greatest where it leaves the least perceptible traces of itself, i.e., where the practices and rules that it encourages look the most remote from those of the foreign donor and the closest to the native/national tradition of the recipient.
9. The net contribution of DPP is most positive when it is “self-canceling,” i.e., when the practices and rules of its specific programs are most quickly taken over by national authorities and politicians and require no further foreign input.
10. The long term probability of a successful transfer of institutions from donor to recipient is greatest when grounded in a generic understanding of what democracy is, yet the short term chance that a given program will work well depends on specific knowledge of conditions in an individual country.
11. DPP works best from the point of view of recipients when there exists a multiplicity of competing donors such that they are capable of picking and choosing the programs/projects that they prefer; DPP works best for donors when they can

collude or divide up the market in such a way that they can compel recipients to accept the programs/projects they think are most effective.

12. Since success in democratization involves “hitting a moving target” of actors and objectives, DPP will have to change its programs/projects in a corresponding fashion and this is likely to mean disrupting and even abandoning previous exchange relations between donors and recipients.

13. The more that DPP becomes a salient and well-funded component of donor foreign policy, the greater will be its appeal to ambitious organizations and individuals in the donor country and the more they will seek to professionalize and control access to its provision. A similar process of closure is also likely to emerge on the side of recipients – especially in those countries with the least “domestic capacity” and, hence, the greatest potential need for DPP. When this professionalization becomes a mutually reinforcing process, the programs/projects will become less-and-less responsive to the needs of democratization and more-and-more difficult to adjust as actors and objectives follow the process of regime change

It will not be easy to convert all of these thirteen skeptical propositions into discrete and testable hypotheses – although all of them are, at least in principle, falsifiable. Some are obviously worded in too abstract a manner; others contain “essentially contested” concepts that would be difficult to measure in an objective manner. Not a few refer to trends whose effects may be too soon to evaluate.

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Hopefully, however, in this volume dealing with the macro-measurement of DPP and the macro-assessment of its impact, we will be able to test several of them. The rest can only be assessed by meso- and micro-analyses of specific programs and projects in particular countries. The best we can expect to extract from this preliminary (but nonetheless essential) analysis is to describe the total magnitude of the DPP effort and its distribution across countries in CEE & MENA, as well as its distribution according to generic types of programs. Then, we can attempt through statistical estimation procedures to assess the probability that DPP has made a significant difference in

either promoting the liberalization of autocracies or the consolidation of democracies – not on particular institutions or practices, but upon the polity as a whole.

Defining the Independent Variable

Democracy promotion/protection is a subset of activities within the international context surrounding contemporary efforts at “national” democratization. It can be defined as follows:

Democracy promotion/protection consists of all overt and deliberate activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, the democratization of autocratic regimes, or the consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries

This definition excludes, among other things, covert activities by external actors (e.g. “quiet” diplomatic efforts or activities of secret services) as well as indirect activities (e.g. literacy campaigns, improving a population's health, generic forms of propaganda, or promoting economic development) that may be justified in terms of their (alleged) impact upon democracy. Their exclusion from the definition of DPP should not be interpreted as implying that they have no impact on political liberalization, democratization, or consolidation of democracy – just that they are qualitatively different in intent and origin. Moreover, the effects of these activities upon regime change are generally very hard or impossible to observe and analyze, either because they are clandestine or because their impact may be temporally unpredictable.

The definition also excludes activities adopted, supported and implemented exclusively by domestic actors, with either no participation of foreign actors or only their fortuitous or informal collaboration. In addition, it also leaves out a number of aspects of the international context that are “without agency,” i.e. that could positively influence the outcome of regime change but without any explicit, policy-directed sponsorship. No one doubts that imitation of one country by another, spontaneous contagion effects that transcend national borders and the learning of lessons from “normal” transactions

between persons in different countries may make liberalization and/or democratization more or less likely, but they will not (and can not) be monitored by this research effort.

Our definition of DPP does include a large variety of activities that donors describe as intended either to promote regime change from autocracy to democracy or to ensure that neo-democracies consolidate themselves. They can focus on: (1) individual citizens; (2) organizations of political society; (3) organizations in civil society; or (4) institutions within the government and state.

Individual Citizens are infrequently the direct subjects of DPP. When they are, it is usually through programs of civic education. These aim at transferring knowledge about democratic institutions and practices, socializing persons to accept civic values, and, hopefully, changing their subsequent behavior with regard to each other and elected officials. In the narrowest sense, civic education can focus only on training individuals why and how to cast votes in elections. Even when it aims at the monitoring of elections, DPP typically is much more concerned with the behavior of public officials or party politicians than with the individual voter.

Organizations in Political Society tend to be synonymous with political parties – or broad social movements that aspire to become political parties – and to participate in elections. They purport to represent the interests and passions of large segments of the population and to compete with each other for public office – which means that foreign support - including training parliamentarians and party cadres, supporting the (re)structuring of their organizations, and assisting in their electoral campaigns - is bound to affect the terms of this contest and to lead to accusations of outside manipulation. Generically, DPP is intended to encourage politicians of whatever party to accept “free and fair” rules for competition and to limit their exercise of power once in office. And it, not infrequently, subsidizes national and international organizations to monitor their respect for such norms.

Organizations of Civil Society. DPP also targets civil society organizations that are at least partially voluntary and relatively independent from the state. They may be involved in the delivery of services to members and even to non-members or they may engage in advocacy for the production of public goods that cannot be exclusively appropriated by their members. Or, as interest associations, they may represent

classes, sectors or professionals in their interactions with state authorities. Whatever the type, programs for assistance consist of one or more of the following items: providing financial resources and equipment, organizing and paying them to monitor elections and government performance, training their personnel or members in organizational skills, transposing models of collective action, inculcating ideas or substantive programs in their leaders, or just socializing them to respect 'civil' norms.

Institutions of Government and State. Democracies – especially fledgling ones – require institutions of legitimate authority and these may be in short supply before and during a regime transition. DPP can make a contribution to such institutions, but only by treading a fine line between reform and repression. Beyond the usual concern with electoral monitoring, this typically involves a focus on legislatures and judicial bodies by supplying them with physical equipment and information about practices in established democracies. This may even extend to assistance in the drafting of national constitutions. More controversial have been policies to modernize the police and train them in respect for human rights. Even though civil control over the military is a fundamental component of democratic government, DPP has rarely ventured into this domain. The territorial decentralization and functional deconcentration of state authority has, however, become a major component of many DPP programs, presumably on the grounds that devolving power to regional, provincial and local institutions serves as an incentive for greater citizen participation and political accountability.

DPP, in our sense, does **not** include actions by foreign countries such as sanctions, diplomatic protests, threats of military intervention intended to depose governing incumbents, external policies to promote the observance of human rights, or diffuse pressures aimed at the transfer of institutions - such as supreme courts, legislatures, or electoral systems.

This predominantly “phenotypic” definition of DPP based on stated actor intentions should not always be taken for granted because, first, these actors may have other, less overt, priorities - for example, promoting economic reform, maintaining a certain foreign policy, or keeping migrants at home - that might even conflict with the declared one to promote/protect democracy. Second, and much less likely, external

actors may engage in activities that they themselves do not define and consider as DPP but, unexpectedly and unintentionally, might actually do the job.

DISTINGUISHING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION FROM DEMOCRACY PROTECTION

In the studies of political regime changes from autocratic to democratic regimes, three qualitatively different processes have been distinguished: (1) political liberalization; (2) democratization; and (3) the consolidation of democracyⁱ.

The process of political liberalization is made up of two core elements: increasing the variety and quality of political liberties; and encouraging the de-stabilization or eventual collapse of autocratic regimes. The process of democratization involves a transformation in which a minimally democratic regime is established, usually as the result of the convocation of “free and fair” elections. The process of consolidation of democracy is qualitatively different from the former two processes because it aims at introducing elements of predictability in an effort to avoid, first of all, a relapse into autocracy and , second, the channeling of social conflicts into legitimate political proceduresⁱⁱ. Measures that are considered to be useful to consolidate newly democratized regimes can even have a negative impact on the likely collapse of autocratic regimes and the initial establishment of democratic ones. For example, reinforcement of the rule of law might stabilize not only a neo-democracy, it might also stabilize an autocracy.ⁱⁱⁱ It is therefore of strategic importance to distinguish between the promotion of, on the one hand, political liberalization and democratization and, on the other hand, the protection (consolidation) of democracy.

Thus, the overarching concept of DPP is made up of two qualitatively different elements, which can be defined as follows.

Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries

Democracy Protection consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries

DIFFERENT FORMS OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION/PROTECTION

Besides the huge increase in the volume of DPP activities, at least two additional major changes regarding DPP have taken place over the past two decades – at least until the invasion of Iraq in 2002. First, there was a shift from coercion in the form of the threat of military intervention to conditionality through the application of positive sanctions, along with the promise of rewards. Second, no doubt related to the first, there has been a sharp increase in the variety of programs and projects in target countries. Probably, this has been due to the emergence of greater willingness (and sometimes even outright enthusiasm) in the recipient countries to tolerate political liberalization and democratization. Needless to say, especially in the well-entrenched autocracies of MENA, this consent was more apparent than real. Incumbents (often temporarily) perceived it to be better to tolerate DPP in their countries in order to avoid potential sanctions, to improve their public image or, simply, to reap material benefits for themselves.

This combination of two characteristics: (1) the **nature and degree of consent** of the authorities of the target country; and (2) the **locus of implementation** produces four generic types of policies intended to bring about regime change.

Coercion, in the form of military intervention and occupation, has been used relatively often historically to unseat autocratic regimes or to prevent the relapse of democratic and newly democratized regimes into autocracies. Although its use has tended to diminish, cases such as Grenada, Panama, Haiti, and, most recently and saliently, Iraq demonstrate that this form of intervention has not been completely abandoned. It is not considered by us either empirically or conceptually to be a form of DPP. A special, border-line, case of coercion emerges when large amounts of foreign

funds are funneled (usually secretly) into a country to influence the outcome of a single election or to try to produce a particular non-confidence vote in parliament. Presumably, in such cases, the objective is to bring to power a candidate or party that is more democratic than the incumbent. This type of episodic foreign intervention has often been credited with great “successes,” for example in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. We have not considered this to be DPP for two reasons: (1) conceptually, because it is not intended to produce democratic institutions or practices (and is contingent on dubious choices about persons and parties); and (2) empirically, because it is almost impossible to gather reliable data on such financial flows given their sources.

Conditionality involves imposing or threatening to impose sanctions and providing or promising rewards in order to promote or protect democracy. This is an important form of DPP and it has expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively since the early 1980s. First, a shift took place from bi-lateral to multi-lateral sources of conditionality. Second, there has been a major shift from threatening sanctions to promising rewards. The latter has increasingly taken the form of offering increased financial aid and/or accession to a prestigious ‘club’ of international actors. At first, membership in the Council of Europe played this role, but accession to the European Union quickly became the most powerful source of conditionality for the Central and Eastern European states. To a much less degree, participation of the Southern Mediterranean countries in the so-called “Barcelona Process” of the EU did the same for MENA countries, along with the signing of bi-lateral national commercial treaties with the EU. One could also place in this cell activities such as transmissions by foreign radio stations and support for oppositions in exile. They also have their primary location of activity outside the recipient countries and are implemented without their consent. Due to the diffuse nature of such policies, however, we have not included them in our compilation of DPP activities.

Consent is where most DPP activities could be found – both for CEE and MENA. They were implemented within the target countries and they required at least minimum agreement from the reigning authorities of the recipient countries – whether they were (well-entrenched) autocrats or (newly-installed) democrats. The consent of the latter in CEE was hardly surprising (and it was reinforced from the start by the anticipated

conditionality of eventual EU membership). What was puzzling – at least for the period under examination – was the apparent willingness of the latter to tolerate foreign sponsored activities within their borders that might have had the effect of transforming the basis of their own authority. In Table One, these activities are labeled: **internal democracy promotion/protection**.

Contagion too comprises DPP activities that need some minimal consent from the authorities of the target country, but they take place abroad, often in the donor country. They typically involve exposing nationals from the recipient country to their counter-parts abroad. This was used very extensively in the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe through the ‘secondment’ and ‘twinning’ of officials to prepare them for eventual EU membership. In MENA, this was much less systematic, e.g. paying judges of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court to visit their counter parts in the US Supreme Court. We have labeled these activities as **external democracy promotion/protection**.^{iv}

The analytical distinction between non-consensual and consensual forms of democracy promotion/protection is not as empirically neat as it may seem, hence, we have introduced a substantial gray area in Table One that we have labeled “tolerated” democracy promotion/protection^v. As mentioned above, a target country may allow programs of DPP to be developed within its borders because it either fears that otherwise sanctions will be imposed or, alternatively, that it will not receive some potential rewards.

The “package” of DPP activities offered to and accepted by a specific recipient country is the outcome of a very complex exchange process in which elements of the stage of regime change, economic opportunity, bureaucratic inertia, expert opinion, available technology, personal initiative, political power and, probably, pure chance all make some contribution. It will be the task of the chapters by Nicolas Guilhot on donors and Imco Brouwer on recipients to try to decipher these components.

EVALUATING DPP: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

In the previous section, we sketched the emergence of the DPP policy agenda, defined what we think it is, and sought to embed it in the broader context of recent theories of democratization. This should provide us at the end of our empirical research with a normative framework for evaluating our findings. We may not be able to test each and every of the 13 “skeptical propositions” that we have started with, but we should be able to advance some general observations about whether or not DPP has worked – or, at least, has made some positive (or negative) contribution to furthering its stated intentions.

However, by using a single label, “Democracy Promotion/Protection,” to cover such a wide range of external interventions we have not made the task easier. The discourse on the part of both donors and recipients has stretched the concept even further than we have. The proliferation of public and private organizations claiming to promote democracy (and competing for funds to do it), no doubt, has contributed to broadening the scope of activities falling under that *rubrique*. Also, the concept of democracy itself has been stretched so that it covers a wide range of attributes that neither define it nor are produced by it. We are told that we should support democracy because it will bring about “conflict prevention,” “international peace,” “secure property rights,” “economic prosperity,” “good governance,” “less corruption,” “more ethnic harmony,” and “greater social equality.” Even if one grants that some (but not all) of these outcomes have eventually become associated with stable “real-existing” liberal democracies, the time needed to produce them is by no means obvious – nor is the causality underlying such historical associations. Using the label so indiscriminately entails the risk of confusing a means of legitimate political procedure with an assumption of substantive purpose that may not be shared by all democratizing polities and societies. Democracies are self-governing units that can presumably make different choices – depending on the preferences of their citizens and the accountability of their rulers. And not all of these choices may be compatible with each other. Politicians have to make such trade-offs all the time and this does not necessarily make them any less democratic. Nor will their policy and institutional choices always conform to the standards set by previous “real-existing” Western democracies.

In other words, the wider the conceptual scope of DPP, the looser will be the probable relationship between the achievements of democracy promoters/ protectors and the democratization process itself. Our strategic choice has been to try to limit that scope and, hence, to restrict our evaluation of outcomes to the performance of fundamental characteristics of the processes of liberalization, democratization and democratic consolidation.

POTENTIAL UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF DPP

Program evaluations rarely address the issue of the possible unintended effects. Policy outcomes can get distorted and they can generate negative as well as positive externalities. It is not sufficient just to measure the extent to which a stated goal has been reached. The evaluator should deal with the entire array of changes emanating from a specific program or project and not to limit his or her effort to those results which bear a direct and manifest causal relationship to donor's stated purpose. This "micro" approach is all the more tempting since it entitles him or her to address only the narrow issue of project success or failure – and this seems to be all that matters to policy makers back home.

Donors perceive their role in precisely such terms. They are 'external actors' who provide support from outside the recipient society and limit themselves to transferring resources and know-how to 'partner' organizations to accomplish what they consider to be pro-democratic tasks. Whether they "strengthen institutions" or "build capacities," they think of themselves merely as "facilitators" whose intervention does not alter the nature or objective of the partner organization. Recent research has shown that the donor-recipient relationship is much more interactive and does affect the behavior, structure and political status of the recipient. These unintended side-effects are usually overlooked and yet they constitute potentially very important factors in the overall impact of DPP. The language is invariably that of "equal partnership," even though the actual relationship is one of asymmetric dependency. For many NGOs entering into such a relation with a donor organization means putting emphasis on activities compatible with the donor's goals and conceptions and it sometimes means

modifying one's established and links to the community or constituency they serve. Recipients tend to develop upward linkages and accountability to their donor which is potentially detrimental to downward accountability to their members^{vi}. Whether as recipients or contractors of external organizations, NGOs run the risk of losing their identity as they absorb external organizational norms and standards. This is not necessarily a matter of "donor capture." Recipients are not always passive targets that are selected according to donors' standards, although they do tend to adapt to the discourse of donors and to pay at least lip service to their values and ideas in order to increase the likelihood of funding. In a similar manner, the increasing number of organizations on the DPP scene and the "organizational explosion" of the past decades have contributed to shaping a very competitive market for donor funds. As a result, the internal culture of NGOs has undergone tremendous changes, increasingly relying on managerial competence and financial accountability and, thus, shifting the emphasis from militancy and voluntary action to technocracy and paid labor, with its concomitant dose of depolitization.

Unintended effects of democracy assistance can also be due to inter-donor communication. There is much evidence that information exchanges and consultative groups between donors have been instrumental in developing a broad consensus about the goals and norms of DPP. Differences between donors are less substantial than in the past, and they are mostly differences of emphasis on diverse components of a broadened but common agenda. Some organizations will have a more normative approach; others a more technical one. Some will deal with the judiciary and human rights, others will focus on elections. But such differences can reflect an underlying division of labor rather than a divergence in political or ideological purposes. As an important consequence of these developments, whomever they turn to, potential grantees will find similar standards and expectations, and virtually identical conceptions of political development and democratization. In other words, there is a discrepancy between the relatively coherent and unified agenda of donors and the diversity of objectives and working methods among recipients. It is unclear the extent to which large donors, in particular, can foster heterogeneity in their programs to promote civil society development. Too much coordination among donors entails the risk of creating

“super-grantees” which penetrate the donor network simply because meeting the requirements of one donor means meeting those of others. This, in turn, generates a divide between those who accept and adapt to donor norms and thus receive greater funding, visibility and influence and those who are excluded from the DPP “business.”

SHIFTING THE METHOD & LEVEL OF EVALUATION

Scholars and observers agree that there is no generally accepted “best practice” for evaluating DPP programs. Rather, there exist a variety of approaches, virtually all of which are wielded by donors. Recipients seem very rarely to have bothered to evaluate their impact. The main obstacles to the validity of such evaluations have been identified and discussed^{vii}. According to Mark Robinson, “the methodological shortcomings of existing approaches are that most evaluations either focus on measurable project outputs or seek evidence of impact in terms of the contribution of donors to macro-level political change.”^{viii} The latter tends to assume rather than to prove the impact of individual projects on the comprehensive process of democratization, even in the absence of any clear causal relationship. For example, the official evaluation of the European Union's Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme, while stressing such constraints as the lack of a “clear set of indicators by which one can single out the impact of a special project” and “the lack of counterfactual evidence” which would allow one to “know the outcome for the institutions if the programmes had not been established,” still attempts to measure impact against the “contribution of the projects to substantive [*sic*] democracy”.^{ix} And it does so without using any comparative analysis of macro-outcomes. This example shows that obstacles are not merely conceptual or operational. Donors are usually eager to discover some contribution at the highest level of political development and formal evaluations, more than explicit statements of purpose, provide them with an opportunity to do so.

To avoid such obvious fallacies of inference, some donors focus exclusively on the level of project or program performance, without seeking to build complex causal chains of causality from the micro to the macro level. The main advantage of this approach is that it emphasizes objective and limited results that can usually be easily

quantified and, hence, made to look “scientific.” By only taking into account the intended results, they ignore the longer term outcomes that may involve un-intended effects.^x

Evaluating such unintended side-effects is not easy. Detailed case studies of individual projects or multi-task programs are unlikely to capture such effects, especially when the evaluation is confined only to the time period covered by the project or program. These effects take time to mature and to accumulate across a sub-set of local recipients. In the extreme, they may even come to form a virtual “caste” of service providers, most of whom were educated in the United States or Europe, and are capable of opportunistically shifting from one form of DPP to another. The more proficient they become at meeting the formal criteria of efficient performance and financial accountability imposed by donors, the less proficient they may become at representing citizen interests or monitoring the behavior of rulers. We are not saying that this is always or even often the case – just that the prevailing methods of evaluation are very unlikely to reveal such unintended consequences.

Therefore, we have chosen a radically different (and, in many respects, potentially equally flawed) method of evaluating the impact of DPP across our CEE & MENA samples in Chapters X, Y & Z. Ours is aimed at capturing the net effect – both positive and negative, intended and unintended – of the total amount of DPP received by each of our countries during the entire period of observation (1982 to 2000). Taking this macro-approach, we are incapable of judging the efficacy or efficiency of any single project or program. Indeed, it is logically possible that every single one of them succeeded in meeting its objectives – and yet all of them together did nothing either to promote liberalization, encourage a transition to democracy or protect its subsequent consolidation. Inversely, they could all have failed and yet the sheer effect of pouring large amounts of DPP into a particular country helped it to accomplish these tasks.^{xi}

In other words, it runs contrary to the prevailing micro-logic of those who have been in the business of evaluating DPP. They seem to assume that, as long as the purpose of a specific project or program is demonstrably capable of promoting or protecting democracy (and usually this means that it has done so somewhere else), and as long as this project or program has been effectively carried out in the country in

question (and, even better if it has been done so efficiently), it must have made a net positive contribution. It also stands to reason that the more such successful projects or programs have been supported, the greater will be their aggregate impact. Above an unspecified (but presumably attainable) threshold, the interaction of so many individual successes could even result in externally-induced “synergies” such that a democratic outcome would become inevitable, regardless of local conditions.

Our “macro-logic” makes no such assumptions and only focuses on the total amount of DPP in US dollars over a given period of time. We might be able to pick up “synergies” hidden behind these total amounts, but we cannot assign responsibility for them to any specific combination of individual projects. Moreover, our method makes the initial assumption that each dollar should have been spent with equal efficiency in each country and for each purpose. The data we have gathered can be disaggregated into generic types of programs and this could tell something eventually about the efficacy of different “mixes” of DPP, although lack of time and funding has prevented us from doing this.

As the reader will discover, our approach also permits us to avoid another common evaluation fallacy. The micro-approach, unless wielded in a very subtle manner, has no way of discerning between the actually observed results and those that might have happened in the absence of any DPP. The temptation is always to presume that the good things that happened were due to the external treatment and the bad ones were due to internal obstacles – when, logically speaking, it could have been the inverse. Administrators have often been accused of precisely this tactic, namely, concentrating on producing effects in policies that would have been pursued regardless and in countries where these results were easiest to produce. The term in bureaucratic jargon is “cherry-picking” among clients and sites. We can test for it by building a statistical model at the macro-level that predicts which countries were most likely to do well in liberalizing their polities, in entering into regime transition and eventually in consolidating democracy. Then, with these predictions serving as “counterfactuals,” we can test whether the total amount of DPP made an independent (and marginal) contribution to the outcome.

* * *

MEASURING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables that we have just defined are obviously each composed of a bundle of theoretically related, but not always empirically co-variant conditions. No single observation is likely to be adequate to measure such complex outcomes, least of all across polities in such diverse social, economic and cultural circumstances. The best that one can hope for is to bring to bear several potential indicators and try to find out what is their underlying structure. At one extreme, they might indeed prove to be so closely correlated that one of them could simply be used as a proxy for the others. At the other extreme, they might vary so independently from each other that the very notion of liberalization or consolidation would have to be rejected. In between lay a considerable range of possible ways for measuring the outcomes that we would like to predict.

Moreover, the (political) liberalization of autocracy and the consolidation of democracy do not have the same theoretical status in the literature. As befits a variable that tends to be used in a relatively non-controversial fashion, the former is not that difficult to measure. It involves selecting a limited, but strategic, set of freedoms that would be widely recognized across different cultures and world regions and desired by most of their inhabitants. It also means not including “advanced” freedoms that are the privilege of citizens in only a few well-developed democracies or “colateral” freedoms that might facilitate or render it more difficult, such as “freedom to own private property,” “freedom to compete for clients,” “freedom from state regulation,” etc. As befits a variable that is quite controversial – even essentially contested – the latter is likely to be much more difficult to pin down, especially to measure quantitatively in such a way that each country can be reliably ranked on a common scale according to the extent to which it has succeeded in consolidating democracy. This implies the need to include initially a much wider range of potential indicators for CoD as a reflection of these theoretical controversies. Of course, it is just possible that, empirically, the items are

related to each other and that the real controversy is not over what “it” is but over what the appropriate threshold for “it” should be.

The measurement strategy we have chosen leaves us with several potential degrees of freedom. We begin with a list of variables that may or may not form a coherent scale and we try to gather systematic and comparable data on countries in CEE and MENA.^{xii} On each item, we try to arrive at a consensual judgement from at least two independent coders on whether or not, by that specific year, the polity in question had accomplished that task or acquired that trait.^{xiii} These will then be analyzed in a variety of ways to try to produce two multi-dimensional scales, one for liberalization and one for consolidation. Some of the items are manifestly easier to satisfy than others; some would seem to proceed others temporally; some might even be causally related to others. A relatively old-fashioned statistical device for measuring such a property is the “scalogram.” The logic of such an indicator is determined by the frequency with which a given sample or population of cases attains specific dichotomous attributes. In other words, the issue is whether country “X” has or has not managed to produce “A.” If that is the feat that receives the highest frequency of “yes” votes, it forms the threshold. The implication is that unless a country has done “A,” it has not yet begun to liberalize its autocracy or to consolidate its democracy. Having the least frequently acquired trait, let us call it “Z,” would indicate that liberalization or consolidation has been effectively accomplished in that country – unless one chooses to move the goalposts and add additional feats that have proven even more difficult to acquire. NB that, even if one finds empirically such an additive structure in the dichotomized data, this is not by itself proof that the revealed hierarchy of traits was acquired in that temporal order, i.e. that the more frequent ones were necessary and prior conditions for the rarer ones. This must be established independently by introducing explicit measures of timing and controlling for possible spurious variables. It should also be noted that the statistical calculations underlying the probability of a valid and significant scalogram are quite demanding and, hence, very unlikely to be satisfied when researching such complex processes are LoA and CoD. To get to this stage, it may prove necessary to eliminate single items that simply refuse to scale and it may even prove necessary to set aside, at least temporarily, individual countries whose

patterns of regime change are “exceptional.” Needless to say, once we have tested and failed to establish “scalogramability,” we will try other multi-dimensional scaling techniques that are less demanding.

[Figure One Here]

Figure One lists the seven items that we have chosen to constitute the LoA scale. Once reliable data has been gathered on the CEE and MENA, as well as others, it should be possible to test the following hypotheses:

- (1) That the items chosen capture significant but different aspects of liberal political rights that are not exclusive to “Western” culture; therefore, they should be relevant and provide equivalent indicators in a wide diversity of cultural settings.
- (2) That these items are correlated in some consistent (if probabilistic) fashion and, therefore, constitute a scale with which it should be possible to make ordinal and even cardinal measurements of the extent of progress toward (political) liberalization.
- (3) That when all seven tasks have been accomplished, the polity being measured will have effectively completed its process of liberalization.^{xiv}
- (4) That when all the criteria have been satisfied it will also more likely that liberalization will persist, since the different items will have become causally related to each other, making it increasingly difficult for rulers to restrict their application.
- (5) Finally, and most controversially, once full liberalization has been attained, there is a high probability that the polity concerned will enter into a transition to democracy.^{xv}

It should be noted in passing that none of the seven items imply that rulers are actually being held accountable to citizens through the competition and cooperation of their representatives/politicians – which is our definition of political democracy. Having an opposition party in parliament does not mean that this party has any power or that the parliament itself has the capacity to overturn actions taken by the executive, much less to change its composition. It also does not imply that elections that placed that opposition in parliament were “free and fair.” A polity can make human rights

“concessions” and still keep its opponents in jail. While there may be a strong likelihood that more than one party has to have been legally recognized before an opposition party can gain access to parliament, the inverse is certainly not necessary: more than one independent party can be recognized, but not win (or be allowed to win) enough votes to be represented in parliament. Trade unions and professional associations can be free from government control or tightly controlled by the government – whether or not pluri-partism exists. Many liberalized autocracies continue to imprison some categories of political opponents while allowing others to form political parties and sit in parliament. Finally, even in otherwise thoroughly liberalized regimes, agents of repression in the military and police can continue violating the human rights of citizens with impunity.

* * *

Rather than shift immediately to the measurement of consolidation, I decided to intersperse a set of items intended to capture selected characteristics of the interim transition period – precisely because our initial descriptive comparison between CEE and MENA countries suggested that this might be part of the regime change process where the two subsets were likely to differ significantly. I also wanted to try to measure something that, elsewhere, I had raised as a probable outcome for many cases of contemporary regime change: “**unconsolidated democracy**.” By this, I tried to identify a sort of “purgatory” in which significant change had been made in the movement away from autocracy and the likelihood of regression to such a regime has become quite low, but little or no progress had been made in getting beyond the transitions by “ ... transforming (its) accidental arrangements, prudential norms and contingent solutions ... into relations that are reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by ... the politicians and citizens I suggested that those countries scoring high on liberalization and transition, but not on consolidation could be considered to be “condemned to democracy” by some combination of external factors (of which DPP was only a part, along with geo-strategic location, international trade relations, dependence on foreign capital and technology, and multi- or uni-lateral political conditionality) and internal calculations (in which the absence of a plausible autocratic alternative played a major role). They might be playing the “democratic game,” but not enjoying its benefits.

FIGURE 2: THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

- D 1 -- Have social/political movements opposing the existing regime entered into public negotiations with it?
- D 2 -- Do open & publicly acknowledged conflicts exist within administrative apparatus of the state over public policies?
- D 3 -- Have formal legal changes been introduced to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime?
- D 4 -- Have constitutional or legal changes been introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable veto-groups?
- D 5 -- Has a Constitution been drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens?
- D 6 -- Have 'founding elections' been held?
- D 7 -- Were these elections "free and fair"?
- D 8 -- Were the results these elections widely and peacefully accepted?

Among this set of questions, there are more "automatisms" that increase the likelihood that something like a scale will emerge from dichotomous scorings. The last three items (6,7&8) are obviously related. It is impossible to declare elections "free and fair" unless they have been held, although the "founding" component implies (1) that they were held under different rules or after a long period of holding no elections; and (2) that they included a wide range of those political forces that expressed a desire to participate in them. Both of these conditions could be satisfied, however, and the conduct of the ensuing elections might not be "free and fair" in the judgement of outside observers. Similarly, this judgement of "free and fair" may not be accepted by significant internal minorities that refuse to accept either the timing or the rules under which they were conducted. Also, if a constitution with equal political rights and civil freedoms is drafted and ratified, it usually will contain within its provisions some limitations on arbitrary executive power and on the role of non-accountable veto groups, such as the military and police. Nevertheless, as a first approximation (and until something better comes along), I am convinced that if we can arrive at reliable judgements about these items, we will have made a significant step toward mapping empirically this confused and uncertain period.

As we have seen above, the consolidation of democracy is not guaranteed even by the most successful of liberalizations – unless something “intervenes” to push the process of regime change beyond the initially limited intentions of autocratic incumbents and/or the initially limited powers of their opponents. And that is what I tried to capture with the transition scale, i.e. those intermediate actions – formal and informal – that bring about a significant and predictable change in the distribution of the power to govern. No doubt, the convocation of “founding elections” and the drafting-ratification of a new or revised constitution are the two most salient “events” that tend to punctuate the transition, but the less visible processes of “pacting” between incumbents and opponents and “resurrecting” civil society may play a key role.

And, simply having gotten through the transition and attained a status in which virtually all those active in politics agree that it is highly unlikely that a regression either to the *statu quo ante* and any other form of autocracy is probable, does not guarantee that some appropriate type of democracy has been established. As we have seen above, scholars differ considerably on the issue of “how high” they would set the threshold for CoD, just as they often have different conceptions of democracy itself in their mind. The items in Figure Three reflect that diversity of opinion – and try to convert it into an empirical indicator that should work across a wide range of national circumstances.¹

FIGURE 3: THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

C 1 -- Is there any significant political party that advocates major changes in the existing constitution?

C 2 -- Are elections held regularly and their outcomes respected by public authorities and major opposition parties?

C 3 -- Have these elections been conducted “freely and fairly” according to prevailing standards?

C 4 -- Are there significant parties or groups that reject the conditions under which elections are conducted?

¹ Although one has to confess that virtually all “orthodox” treatments of the issue tend to have an “electoralist” bias that presumes that, if elections of some uncertain outcome are held fairly and regularly between competing parties, then, social and other conflicts will be channelled into that form of representation and elected officials will be able to act legitimately in resolving those conflicts. To the best of my knowledge, no one has been

C 5 -- Has electoral volatility, the tendency for voters to change from one party to another in successive elections, diminished significantly?

C 6 -- Is there evidence that elected officials & representatives have been constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto groups within country?

C 7 -- Has there been a rotation-in-power or major shift in alliances of parties since the existing rules were established?

C 8 -- Has there been a second rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties?

C 9 -- A 'sub-scale' of items in items intended to test for the consolidation of rules within key 'partial regimes.'

9.1 – Has a consensual agreement, formal or informal, been reached on the rules governing the formation and activities of interest associations and social movements?

9.2 – Has a consensus been reached on the format of executive power, e.g. on a parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential system?

9.3 – Has an agreement been reached on the territorial division of *compétences* between national and sub-national governments?

9.4 – Has an agreement, formal or informal, been reached on the rules of ownership & access to the institutions of mass media?

These items quite obviously represent political accomplishments of a different order of magnitude and facility of measurement. A few (e.g. electoral volatility) can even be measured by relatively standard indicators; others (e.g. the “freedom and fairness” of elections) may require complex normative judgements that shift over time. Virtually, no democracy of the 19th century held elections that would be considered “free and fair” by today’s standards. Even such an apparently simple judgement as “rotation-in-power” can become problematic in multi-party parliamentary systems where one has to assess whether certain shifts in the composition of those in government is somehow “functionally equivalent” to changes that are registered in a more obvious fashion in two-party presidential systems. If one does not entertain this possibility, the national regime in Switzerland – one of the most ultra-consolidated in virtually every other respect – would not qualify fully. Even at the communal and cantonal levels, there has almost never been a rotation in the strict sense. I will not even comment on the intrinsic

able to come up with a conceptualization of a consolidated (“modern, liberal, political”) democracy that does not reflect that assumption.

difficulty in assessing how and when non-accountable actors (“*los poderes fácticos*” is the apposite Spanish expression) intervene to countervene the actions of accountable ones. Not only is this, virtually by definition, a secretive process in which the mere anticipation of a *golpe* or *incidente* may be enough to invoke conformity, but also it threatens to open a vast zone of ambiguity with regard to groups that are capable of withholding valuable material (“an investment strike” or “a flight of capital”) or cultural (“an ecclesiastical excommunication”) resources.²

Similarly, with assessing the significance of a “non-liberal-democratic” party that advocates major constitutional changes. In the recent past, the existence of such a party capturing a significant proportion of votes might have been a plausible indication that the regime was not consolidated.³ In the contemporary context, virtually all parties agree publicly that “democracy is the only game in town” (to use the criterion of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan). What they often contest is whether their “freely and fairly” elected opponents are actually following its rules and not unfairly exploiting their “incumbency resources.”

* * *

Strictly speaking, it is not in the (self-assigned) province of this project on DPP to evaluate its impact upon the **Quality of Democracy** (QoD) – although it is not foreclosed that we may do so. We seem to have been assuming that when (and if) DPP has its intended effect upon the consolidation of democracy, it will simply shut itself down -- pack up its personnel and resources and go back home, or shift them elsewhere. Something approaching this may have happened with the CEE countries where the descriptive observation has been made that such programs have tended to migrate further east towards Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union and south towards the former republics of Yugoslavia and Albania, and the causal explanation advanced is that this is a rational response to objective needs. Nevertheless, it would be unwise to exclude the possibility that DPP’s impact upon CoD may exercise some influence upon the subsequent quality of democracy or that DPP

² For practical reasons, it was decided to stick to those non-accountable actors capable of exercising physical coercion.

³ Although one should distinguish between the (largely rhetorical) rejection of “bourgeois democracy” and the fact that many Western communist parties played quite loyally according to its rules.

may become self-perpetuating and attach itself to improving some of the less procedural and more qualitative aspects of neo-democracies.

In Figure Four I have listed the items in a prospective scalogram of QoD. None of them define democracy as such (in the procedural sense that we are using it), but all have been inferred by one author or another as likely (and desirable) products of the continuous functioning of democratic institutions. A rapid glance at well-established democracies would immediately confirm that they have differed considerably in all of these qualitative aspects – even if, one can detect a convergence in outcomes in recent decades. Moreover, there is some reason to suspect that they may be connected with each other – either causally or functionally. For example, greater participation in units of civil society and/or a broader dispersion of political resources may tend, over time, to produce greater social and economic equality. Survey research indicates that increases in the sense of personal “political efficacy” are related to lowering electoral abstention. The diffusion of the rule of law in different domains across national territory can result in greater gender equality or more participation in interest associations and social movements. Much evidence on some of these matters has been gathered and analyzed at the micro-level of individuals, but we still not know empirically how they cluster at the macro-level of whole polities.

FIGURE 4: THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

- Q 1 – Are the consensual agreements embedded in the constitution and rules on partial regimes being effectively and equally applied to all social groups & territorial units in the polity?
- Q 2 – Have the conditions of political competition become more equal for most citizens & groups?
- Q 3 – Has greater equality in participation produced greater substantive (i.e. income) equality for most citizens & groups?
- Q 4 – Has voter turnout decreased or increased significantly, or remained the same over 3 successive national elections?
- Q 5 – Have memberships in interest associations & social movements increased & have they extended their coverage to wider range of interests/passions?
- Q 6 – Have individual citizens show an increasing tendency to regard themselves as personally "politically efficacious"?
- Q 7 – Has equality between men and women improved?

Again, we find items of differing specificity in conceptualization and ease of measurement. Judging the extent to which the constitution and rules about major partial regimes are evenly applied across the national territory and social “surface” is obviously no easy task. Guillermo O’Donnell has popularized the notion of “brown areas” outside of major cities (and presumably outside of dominant ethnic groups or social classes) in which otherwise resolutely democratic norms are systematically ignored or violated – and suggested that this is especially characteristic of neo-democracies (and especially of neo-democracies in Latin America) where “the rule of law” has succeeded not preceded “the rule of democracy.” But how can one measure the extent of these “brown areas or classes”? Even if one turned to examining court cases challenging the misapplication of norms, the risk would be to miss precisely those areas and classes in which violations were so systematic that no one imagined that such a recourse would be successful. The same with greater equality in the conditions of political competition. Obviously, the “concession” of the electoral franchise and freedom of association to all adults is by itself an element of equalization that is characteristic of all neo-democracies, but how these rights are exercised can be a very differential matter. One “unobtrusive,” i.e. indirect, measure of this might be the margin of victory between political parties and/or the presence of competing sets of class associations (i.e. pluralism).

Changes in income and gender equality can be (and have been measured) quantitatively across a large number of polities, but data on such attitudinal items as “sense of personal political efficacy” is much harder to come by on a comparative (not to mention, longitudinal) basis. The evolution of electoral participation over time is easy to measure, but not so easy to interpret. Virtually everywhere in neo-democracies, abstention tends to increase after the “civic orgy” that usually accompanies the “founding elections,” but does this indicate relative citizen satisfaction and rational “free-riding,” or a persistent and growing disenchantment (*desencanto*) with the emerging class of politicians? Data on the diversity of purposes and membership of individuals in the organizations of civil society is notoriously hard to come by, and can easily be distorted. Seizing on one type of organization for which there exist data – whether it is

trade unions or bowling societies – can be quite unrepresentative of collective actions that are occurring elsewhere in society.

Let us just admit that it is not going to be easy to measure the QoD in a reliable inter-subjective fashion, but not use this as an excuse to exclude it from our analysis – just as an incentive to develop better indicators in the future.

PROBING BUT YET ANALYZING SOME DATA

Thanks to the collaboration of *ricercatori* from the EUI who either come from or are working on various CEE or MENA countries, we have made an effort over the past months to answer the questions posed in each of the four clusters: (1) liberalization; (2) transition; (3) consolidation; and (4) quality of democracy. Each country was coded independently by at least two persons.⁴ The few cases for which we have only one set of scores have been set aside and will only be included in the eventual statistical analysis once we have at least a second set of scores.

Our “sample” includes the following countries: (1) for Central and Eastern Europe, we have the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia; and (2) for the Middle East and North Africa, we have Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey.

Due to some conflicting commitments and the lack of potential scorers, I have not been able to gather and evaluate all the data I would have preferred. For example, it would be desirable to add the Baltic Republics, Armenia, Georgia and, perhaps, Belarus and the Ukraine to the CEE set. Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen would be valuable additions to the MENA set.

Due to my incompetence and delayed attention, we have yet to put together the tools for multi-dimensional scaling that will enable us to subject the data we already have to statistical analysis. In the meantime, all I can do is apply the famous “inter-ocular impact test,” i.e. I can stare at the data and try to see what are its most salient characteristics.

⁴ We found that it was desirable to allow scorers to choose an intermediate point between 0 = NO, i.e. no accomplishment or appreciable effort with regard to this trait and 1 = YES, i.e. this trait has been accomplished or satisfied. The score 0.5 = something has been done on this trait, but it has not yet been “accomplished.”

- (1) The liberalization “scale” shows the expected dramatic difference between the two regions. All of the CEE countries (including Slovakia) attain a high score (6,5-7,0) within two years after the collapse of the previous autocracy and none of them regresses from that level. None of the MENA countries reaches such a high level of liberalization (the highest scores are 6 for Morocco in 1997-99 and 5 for Algeria in 1989-90) and several of them show clear signs of periodic regression and “back-tracking” (e.g. Algeria from 5,0 to 2,5; Egypt from 3,5 to 2,0; Turkey from 4,5 to 3,0)
- (2) The transition “scale”
- (3) The consolidation “scale”
- (4) The quality of democracy “scale”

CONCLUDING WITH SOME DOUBTS

Ultimately, what ultimately counts for the future of these neo-democracies is their **legitimacy**. This may well be where the contribution of DPP is most problematic since virtually none its program and projects can be demonstrably shown to contribute positively to such an outcome and there is even the suspicion that the intromission of foreign agents may undermine regime legitimacy in the eyes of its national citizens.

Moreover, legitimacy has proven notoriously difficult to measure empirically. We can presume that a fully consolidated democracy is more likely to persist over time, but this could be the product of habit, inertia or the lack of an alternative. It is the quality of democracy – not its consolidation as a set of rules – that is likely to have the determining influence on legitimacy and, hence, on the regime’s presumptive capacity to persist when faced by serious exogenous challenges or dramatic endogenous declines in performance. The presence of legitimacy, however, is usually inferred from what does **not** occur, rather than what can be directly observed. Whenever and wherever certain forms of collective violence, resistance or struggle do **not** manifest themselves -- i.e. whenever or wherever resourceful and conflictful protagonists agree to play by established rules rather than try to eliminate each other from contention, or whenever and wherever subordinates defer without a fight to the commands of

"superior" rulers -- we tend to assume that the democratic regime must be legitimate and, hence, that its quality must be satisfactory according to the prevailing standards of that citizenry.

We would concede that this is not a very satisfactory state of affairs from the point of view of normative democratic theory. It can mask the hegemony of "pre-political" forces of social and economic oppression. It can fail to disclose the manipulative effects of mass media. It may be more a product of resignation and apathy than of respect for the decisions of authorities or the political rights of fellow citizens. But it is still a safer base for inference than relying on the opinions of theorists and intellectuals who are disappointed that neo-democracy has not brought with it all the qualities that they had hoped for.

Chapter 'X'

EXPLORING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: THE LIBERALIZATION OF AUTOCRACY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

Let us begin with a calculatedly naïve assertion: the purpose of donors and recipients entering into an exchange with regard to DPP is either to improve the likelihood of political liberalization where the prevailing regime is autocratic or to improve the likelihood of the consolidation of democracy where the previous autocracy has collapsed or voluntarily entered into a regime transition. Now, we know that this will not always be the case. Donors, as we have seen in Chapter Two, can have a multitude of other objectives in mind – national security, commercial advantage, political subordination, responsiveness to exile or immigrant groups, enhanced international reputation – that they may not wish to disclose. Recipients, as we have seen in Chapter Three, may only be interested in taking in the additional financial resources or in pretending to outsiders that they are open to the prospect of regime change. Presumably, if either is the case, we will be able to discover this empirically since this would mean that DPP would have little or no significant impact upon either liberalization or democratization. And yet both sides might even be quite satisfied with the exchange since they could have obtained what they “really” wanted from it!

Let us also assume – this time even more naively – that the liberalization and/or democratization that seems to be mutually desired by the contracting parties is the same, i.e. that it is some form of Western, liberal, constitutional, individualistic, pluralist, electorally competitive, law-abiding, human rights regarding regime.

This is certainly more likely to be the case on the donor side of the equation, since all of them seem to believe that they are promoting the same basic set of political values and rules – regardless of some considerable variation in the institutions that they actually use at home for these purposes. Unlike some periods in the recent past when foreign public and private actors intervened in

the domestic affairs of recipient countries in order to bring about quite different changes at the regime level; nowadays, virtually all the donors think of themselves as trying to do the same thing – even if they may sometimes not agree on the specific means for attaining the common goal. One unobtrusive indicator for this unprecedented convergence among the donors is the fact that they seem to engage in cooperative (not to say, collusive) behavior in the implementation of DPP programs in recipient countries.

Seen from the recipients' perspective, not only is there a good deal more competition among them to attract support from donors, but there is also reason to suspect that the desired political values and rules are a good deal less consensual and at times even conflictual. If the democratization literature cited in Chapter One has only one message to convey, it would be that a long-term successful outcome depends critically on whether recently liberated and enfranchised citizens come to regard their new institutions as legitimate, i.e. as uniquely appropriate for and consistent with the values of that particular society, and that usually means that these institutions cannot be identical to those of well-established democracies. Almost without exception, they have to be “adapted as well as adopted” and made to conform to some real or imagined set of national values and symbols. Even in those cases in which there is a manifest and widespread desire to imitate Western, liberal, constitutional, etc. institutions (e.g. Central Eastern Europe), there can still be lots of room for misunderstanding and misapplication and a consequent need for re-phrasing and re-forming the content of what is being transferred. Needless to say, among the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, the transfer of “lessons” along with funds from donor countries is likely to meet with much more skepticism among the “natives” -- not to say, outright hostility – given the “colonial” nature of the source and the greater cultural distance involved.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the minds of external actors involved in DPP, the generic objectives are therefore quite clear – even if the means for attaining them remain ambiguous and illusive. In the short-term, it may be the liberalization of autocracy, but eventually it is supposed to be the consolidation of democracy. They may, of course, use other terms to describe what they are trying to do. They may also not always agree on how autocratic the existing regime is or what kind of democracy is appropriate for the recipient country. And, as we have seen, the donors may have other objectives in mind for themselves and their country. But the yardstick for measuring the success of their multiple and diverse activities is whether a given program makes a positive contribution to increasing the probability that something recognizable to them (and, hopefully, to the citizens in the target country) as a “democracy” will be the outcome of regime change. It is very important to note that foreign agents of DPP rarely, if ever, contribute much to initiating *ex novo* this process of change, although their intervention may make a significant contribution *ex post* to the success of the transition once it has started and to the eventual consolidation of some type of democracy once the “natives” have begun to settle into the trenches of normal politics. In short, the takeoff is usually beyond their control, and it is the subsequent trajectory that concerns them the most.

Unfortunately for our purpose of assessing the impact of DPP on liberalization and/or consolidation, neither of these concepts has been satisfactorily defined in the literature. They may have been used quite often, but almost invariably in an inconsistent fashion – even by the same author in the same work. Moreover, the empirical indicator that has been most frequently employed in quantitative analyses, the Freedom House Index, is seriously deficient and distorted, especially when used to measure the variation in ... and ... over time.^{xvi} What makes our task especially challenging is the need to operationalize both of these “outcomes” in such a way that our measurements are apposite, accurate and comparable not only for the macro-analysis of the impact upon whole countries, but also for the meso- and even micro-analyses of specific programs and projects. And we need to do so in a manner that is sensitive to rather discrete

changes over time and, hence, that can capture the dynamics and sequences of both liberalization and consolidation processes.

Liberalization is a commonly used and well accepted term in both political and scholarly discourse. However, since it seems to most persons to be a desirable state of affairs, it has been appropriated for a wide range of purposes – not all of which are appropriate from the perspective of this research. Strictly speaking, we (and, we presume, the agents of DPP) should be exclusively concerned with **political** liberalization. Elsewhere, this has been defined as: “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.”^{xvii} Needless to say, there can be a considerable range of dispute over what these civic/political rights should be, but there does exist a widespread consensus on some of them. At the level of individuals, these guarantees include the classic elements of the liberal tradition: *habeus corpus*, sanctity of private home and correspondence, protection against torture and inhuman treatment by authorities, the right to be defended in a fair trial according to pre-established laws, freedom of movement, speech, petition, religious conviction and so forth. For social or political groups, these rights have historically covered such things as freedom from punishment for collective expressions of dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication and freedom to associate voluntarily and peacefully with other persons.

Nota bene what has **not** been included in this conceptualization of liberalization. No doubt that in the course of political struggle in well-entrenched democracies the content and coverage of rights have expanded over time and, at least in the case of Europe and North America, have tended to converge toward a shared set of norms. Nevertheless, items such a “freedom of access to public documents,” “freedom of sexual expression,” “right to free legal counsel,” “right to bear arms,” “freedom from capital punishment,” “right to vote for legally resident foreign nationals,” “*le droit à la différence* extended to foreign language instruction, chador wearing or female circumcision,” or even “rights protecting minority cultures from assimilation” are still quite unequally distributed and

respected across these countries and they are even less likely to find widespread acceptance in “non-Western” cultures.

More controversially given the ideology that currently surrounds the topic of democratization, no mention has been made of an unconditional “right to private property” or any of the other “freedoms” currently being advocated by economic liberals: abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on international trade, privatization of state-owned enterprises, dismantling of regulatory regimes on financial transactions, production systems and consumer protection, removal of price controls or currency restrictions, lowering of tax burdens, decentralization of collective bargaining or its replacement with individual labor contracts, abolition of state subsidies to producers, sale of public housing to private occupants *e cosi via!* One of the major assumptions of neo-liberals is that these aspects of economic liberalization are causally linked to political liberalization and eventual democratization and, hence, anything that is done by foreigners to encourage natives to adopt these policies should be considered *eo ipso* as DPP. Leaving aside the obvious historical observation that virtually all of the well-entrenched democracies made extensive use of illiberal economic policies when they were developing their respective capitalist economies and consolidating their respective political democracies, one could leave open for empirical examination whether these different forms of liberalization are so tightly correlated with each other in the contemporary world and, if so, in what temporal sequence. To do otherwise would risk not only being incapable of testing this core hypothesis, but also labeling virtually everything that donors do in their foreign aid programs as DPP.

What is essential for the purpose of this research project is for us to grasp conceptually and then measure empirically **political** liberalization *in strictu sensu*. At a minimum, this involves a passive and voluntary connection between individuals and groups who are permitted (but not compelled) by authorities to engage in certain forms of “free” behavior and a reliable and permanent commitment by authorities not to engage in certain forms of “coercive” behavior. The shorthand term for this in much of the literature is “exercising and respecting

the rule of law” – even if this may imply a much wider range of connections and commitments, and even if many laws actually on the books are hardly “liberal” in their economic or social content.

What liberalization alone does **not** connote is the right for citizens acting equally and collectively to hold their rulers accountable, up to and including the possibility that these citizens can remove their rulers from power by a pre-established procedure, e.g. by defeating them in elections. That process of inserting accountability to citizens into the political process is what is meant by democratization and its consolidation.

Consolidation of Democracy is a much less common and more controversial term. At first glance, it even seems oxymoronic -- a contradiction in terms. Democracies are not supposed to be fully consolidated -- ever. Unique among regime types, they incorporate the potentiality for continuous change and, eventually, self-transformation. By a process of citizen mobilization, deliberation among representatives and collective choice by rulers, they can not only peacefully remove governments from power, but they can also decide to alter their basic rules and structures.

This "theoretical" reflection clashes, however, with everyday experience in well-established democracies. Not only do their patterns and norms become *de facto* structured in highly predictable and persistent ways, but considerable effort is expended *de jure* to make it quite difficult to change these structures. Past -- so-called "founding" -- generations write constitutions that attempt to bind subsequent ones to a specific institutional format and set of rights -- and they can deliberately make them difficult to amend. They also draft statutes and codes which render certain kinds of political behavior punishable, and that creates specific constituencies and rewards particular clienteles that, in turn, make difficult (or even exclude) the entry of new parties into the electoral arena, confer monopolistic recognition upon certain associations, and so forth. Granted that constitutions can be ignored, policies can be reversed and laws can be changed in response to pressures from the *demos*, one should not exaggerate how easily and frequently this can occur in even the most loosely-structured of democracies.

So, uncertainty may well be, as Adam Przeworski has argued,^{xviii} a central and enduring characteristic of this type of regime, but it is a form of relative uncertainty heavily conditioned by relative certainties. For citizens to tolerate the possibility that their opponents may occupy or influence particular governing positions in their polity and that these newly empowered authorities may even pursue different, possibly damaging, courses of action requires a great deal of mutual trust -- backed by a great deal of structural reassurance.

The consolidation of democracy can be seen as the process or, better, the processes that make such trust and reassurance more likely. This, in turn, makes regular, uncertain and yet circumscribed competition for office and influence possible and institutionalizes the practice of "contingent consent," i.e. the willingness of actors to compete according to pre-established rules and, if they lose, to consent to the winners the right to govern – contingent upon the right of the losers to compete fairly and win honestly in the future. In other words, CoD seeks to institutionalize certainty in one subset of political roles and policy arenas, while institutionalizing uncertainty in others. And the challenge for democracy consolidators is to find a set of institutions that embody contingent consent among politicians and are capable of invoking the eventual assent of citizens. All this during the period of especially high uncertainty that is characteristic of transiting from one type of regime to another!

It should be noted that politicians and citizens do not necessarily have to agree upon a set of substantive goals or policies that command widespread consensus, but they do have to agree on a common set of rules. This "democratic bargain", to use Robert Dahl's felicitous expression,^{xix} can vary a good deal from one society to another, depending on objective inequalities and cleavage patterns, as well as subjective factors such as the extent of mutual trust, the prevailing standards of fairness, the willingness to compromise and the legitimacy attached to different decision rules in the past. Once it is struck, the bargain may even be compatible with a great deal of dissensus on specific substantive issues.

Foreigners, in general, and DPP donors, in particular, have an obvious contribution to make to this process since they have presumably gone through an analogous process of regime change and managed to find rules for competition and cooperation that were mutually acceptable to their citizens and politicians. The obvious catch, however, is that the discovery of these rules may not only have been made some time ago, but under quite different physical and cultural circumstances. Moreover, the very nature of democracy itself has changed and there is no guarantee that institutions that produced trust and reassurance in the past are still capable of making such a positive contribution.

Thomas Carouthers has observed that most practitioners of DPP employ a “natural model” of the democratization process.

“The “core strategy that U.S. democracy promoters usually follow (...) incorporates (...) a model of democratization” (p. 85) ... (which) “centers on the notion of a natural sequence of political steps.” (p. 87). “Democratization is assumed to proceed along a relatively set path: It starts, according to the model, when a nondemocratic regime, faced with waning legitimacy and rising popular pressure for liberalization, decides it must permit a political opening. The opening occurs; opposition groups and independent civic actors multiply. These newly mobilized forces press the government to hold multiparty national elections. The elections are held and an elected government takes power. The initial transition achieved, gradual consolidation follows.”^{xx}

Although he denies that they were strongly influenced by academic scholars in coming up with this model, it conforms rather well to the one that “transitologists” and “consolidologists” have been using.^{xxi} Its first assumption-*cum*-hypothesis is that political liberalization usually precedes the transition to some other form of political domination by a noticeable margin of time, although the leads and lags can be quite variable from one country to another and in some cases the two “stages” may occur virtually simultaneously. Secondly, the process of liberalization tends to be more variable and, hence, less predictable over time than the subsequent process of consolidating democracy because its policies are easier to retract (or to distort in practice) and have less of an enduring impact on organizational capacity. Thirdly, a major reason for this is that political liberalization tends to focus upon (and sometimes limit itself to) the

concession of rights and protections to individuals rather than to units of collective action, i.e. civil society, whose subsequent behavior is more difficult to control. Fourthly, liberalization is by no means uniquely and universally associated with (i.e. “causes”) regime transition, much less the eventual consolidation of democracy, but it does alter the likelihood that the latter will occur. Fifthly, once a regime transition has begun and a new government has been formed – whether or not as the result of “free and fair” elections – politicians and representatives are likely to make pacts with each other, experiment with *ad hoc* and even *ad hominem* arrangements, impose changes in policy from above, redefine legal norms, alter practices of repression and, thereby, establish precedents that eventually contribute to making consolidation easier or more difficult. In other words, the processes of liberalization, transition and consolidation tend to overlap in different ways and this makes the whole process of regime change much less predictable than the “over-determined” politics of countries with stable regimes.

Another way of making this point is to stress the variety of modes of transition.^{xxii} The autocratic incumbents involved in liberalization may act unilaterally, in (implicit) collusion or in (explicit) coalition with opponents. They may intend to change the type of regime, i.e. to democratize the polity, or merely to improve the viability of their own autocratic rule, i.e. “to change in order that nothing changes.” Whatever their intentions, their actions frequently produce unintended consequences and trigger “undesirable” effects that can force them to go further than they originally intended. Whatever the process or the intention, these tendencies to lay down changes in the “rules” are never sufficient on their own to ensure that liberalization will lead to democratization. This depends on a variety of intervening variables and one of these may be democracy promotion and protection by external actors.

In the literature the most significant intervening variable that has been mentioned is the so-called “resurrection of civil society” which suggests the hypothesis that DPP’s effect upon the linkage between liberalization and democratization will depend on the extent to which it can contribute to mobilizing

associations, movements and parties that either did not exist before or were incapable of asserting/inserting themselves into the political process during autocratic rule. Other channels of DPP could also make a positive impact, e.g. by monitoring the conduct of elections, training opposition parties in campaign techniques or furnishing them with data from public opinion polls, improving parliamentary procedures, educating citizens about their rights, or enhancing the independence of the judiciary. "Enabling" these organizations to act with greater autonomy or legal security might just "empower" them to ask for more and, thereby, contribute to pushing the process of change beyond the limits initially envisaged by liberalizing autocrats and their timid democratic allies.

So, when actors change from one political regime to another, they initially pass through a period of considerable uncertainty during which regression to the *statu quo ante* remains possible and the destination to which their efforts are leading remains unclear. The transition period can vary in length, depending in large measure on the mode of regime change that has been adopted, but eventually it must end. The costs -- psychic as well as material -- are simply too great for actors to endure indefinitely. While there will always be some for whom the exhilaration of participating in a continuous "war of movement" remains an end in itself, most actors look forward to settling into a "war of positions" with known allies, established lines of cleavage and predictable opponents -- or to leaving politics and getting on with their other careers or pursuits.

We are now prepared for a formal definition of what it is that we are (ultimately) committed to explaining:

(1) Regime consolidation consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition into institutions, i.e. into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and normatively accepted by those persons or collectivities defined as the participants/citizens/ subjects of such institutions; and

(2) The consolidation of a democratic regime, then, consists of transforming the *ad hoc* political relations that have emerged piecemeal and partially into stable institutions in such a way that the ensuing channels of access, patterns of inclusion, resources for action and norms about decision-making conform to one overriding standard: "That of citizenship. This involves both the **right** to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with respect to the making of collective choices and the **obligation** of those implementing such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity. Inversely, this principle imposes the **obligation** on the ruled to respect the legitimacy of choices made by deliberation among equals (or their representatives), and the **right** for the rulers to act with authority (and, therefore, to apply coercion when necessary) in order to promote the effectiveness of such choices and to protect the regime from threats to its persistence."^{xxiii}

To accomplish this, politicians have to agree upon a set of institutions and citizens have eventually to consent (implicitly or explicitly) to the choices made by their representatives. Much of this takes place in an open and deliberative fashion and manifests itself in formal public acts: the drafting and ratifying of a constitution; the passing of laws by parliament; the issuance of executive decrees and administrative regulations; interminable discussions in party congresses and local meetings. Some of it, however, emerges more incidentally and unself-consciously from on-going "private" arrangements within and between the organizations of civil society and from the often informal interactions between them and various agencies of the state. No one doubts that most of the choosing and virtually all of the consenting has to be done by "natives" – if one leaves aside the (few) historical cases in which the country undergoing the regime change was conquered and occupied by "foreigners."

For DPP to have any effect, its practitioners have to somehow penetrate these public and private exchanges – usually by invitation and often only when permitted to do so by incumbent rulers. Of course, they have some scarce

resources to offer: money, expertise, access to travel, the prestige of coming from successful democracies and, in the case of Europe, the prospect of facilitated entry into a very prized regional club – but this may not be sufficient to produce any impact, least of all, a positive one. What seems crucial is “local knowledge” and that may be in short supply – especially in particular stages of the regime change process.

This suggests three hypotheses:

1. The impact of DPP upon political liberalization will be most significant in those instances where the recipient country and incumbent regime has entered this process in a deliberate and protracted fashion. Where it occurs rapidly and unexpectedly – say, with the sudden collapse of the *ancien régime* – the impact will be less because the local knowledge of outsiders will be insufficient, as will be their capacity to mobilize resources.
2. The impact of DPP during the transition period narrowly defined, i.e. between the announced change of government and the point-of-no-return at which regression to autocracy becomes inconceivable, will be minimal because local knowledge again is likely to be especially crucial in making choices and because the high level of uncertainty makes it difficult to bring appropriate resources to bear.
3. The impact of DPP is likely to be greatest upon the eventual consolidation of democracy (if this occurs) since the process is much more protracted, follows increasingly predictable patterns and allows for the development by outsiders of higher levels of local knowledge.

When they approach the task of assisting democracy, DPP practitioners are likely to discover that what they are trying to influence is not a single thing, but a bundle of things. One of the points stressed in some of the literature is that **modern democracy should be conceptualized, not as "a single regime," but as a composite of "partial regimes."**^{xxiv} As CoD progresses,

each of these partial regimes becomes institutionalized in a particular sequence, according to distinctive principles, and around different sites -- all, however, having to do with the representation of social groups and the resolution of their ensuing conflicts. Parties, associations, movements, localities and various *clientele* compete and coalesce around these different sites in efforts to capture office and influence policy and, where this is successful, it will have the effect of channeling conflicts toward the public arena, thereby, diminishing recourse to such private means as settling disputes by violence or simply imposing one's will by authoritarian *fiat*. Authorities with different functions and at different levels of aggregation interact with these representatives of interests and passions, base their legitimacy upon their accountability to different citizen interests (and passions), and reproduce that special form of legitimate power that stems from exercising an effective monopoly over the use of violence.

Constitutions are efforts to establish a single, overarching set of "meta-rules" that would render these partial regimes coherent, assign specific tasks to each and enforce some hierarchical relation among them. If they could gain access to the drafting of such a document, DPP practitioners presumably could exercise considerable influence over the outcome at relatively little cost. But constitutions are rarely successful in delineating and controlling all of the relations between partial regimes. The process of convoking a constituent assembly, producing an acceptable draft and ratifying it by legislative approval and/or popular referendum, undoubtedly, represents a significant moment in CoD and a prize "target of opportunity" for DPP, but many partial regimes will be left undefined. For it is precisely in the interstices between different types of representatives that constitutional norms are most vague and least prescriptive.^{xxv} Even the most detailed of constitutions (and they are becoming more detailed) is unlikely to tell us much about how parties, associations and movements will interact to influence policies. Or about how capital and labor will bargain over income shares under the new meta-rules. Or about how civilian authorities will exert control over the military.

So, the consolidation of democracy involves coming up with rules that are

mutually acceptable to rulers and citizens for a set of “partial regimes,” each of which serves to articulate different channels of representation. In the “normal” (but by no means necessary and inevitable) train of events leading from the liberalization of autocracy to the consolidation of democracy, this first involves establishing accountability in the domain of electoral competition between political parties representing territorial constituencies. The convocation of so-called “founding elections” is, for many countries, the critical moment during the transition when liberalization gives way to democratization and in order to hold them, “fair rules” and “honest practices” have to be negotiated or imposed or else key groups will not participate and the ensuing elections will be deprived of the “founding effect.” Subsequently, sets of rules will be drafted and ratified for other generic domains of modern political democracy, such as civil-military relations, bargaining between capital and labor, the territorial distribution of government authority, the relations between executive and legislative powers, and so forth.^{xxvi} When one thinks about it, given the complexity of contemporary polities with their vastly expanded functional tasks, the number of partial regimes seems virtually unlimited, although some are quite clearly more significant than others are. Moreover, the rules governing access and behavior in them are by no means uniform. Simple majorities may suffice in one, but would be quite unacceptable in another where delicate matters of “proportionality” and “intensity” have to be weighed in order to reach a binding decision. Once the most important of these partial regimes have settled into a set of consensual rules that are “reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by ... the politicians and citizens” who participate in them, one can safely conclude that democracy had indeed been consolidated and that the country involved had successfully chosen an appropriate type of democracy. As we shall see later, however, this tells us nothing about the “quality of democracy” being practiced in that country.

This way of conceptualizing CoD carries with it several implications:

1. It means envisaging consolidation as a complex and unevenly accomplished process rather than as a single and linear accomplishment that has usually been conceived as that of conducting “free and fair” elections and, thereby, stabilizing party competition.
2. Which, in turn, requires the analyst to acknowledge that the multiple processes that go into CoD may not occur simultaneously or even in ways that are closely linked to each other – either causally or normatively.
3. Which implies that the tempo, rhythm, and sequence with which these partial regimes establish their distinctive rules and practices may be an important determinant of the success of the ultimate outcome.
4. Which raises the larger (and unresolved) theoretical issue of whether these partial regimes “cluster” in a limited number of types of democracy and, in turn, whether one or another of these *Gestalt* can be prescribed for countries with specific patterns of social cleavage or economic inequality.
5. All of this implies that, while transitologists quite explicitly focus on minimalist-procedural-even electoralist definitions of modern political democracy, consolidologists have to broaden the scope of their definition of the dependent variable to include aspects of ruler/representative/citizen relations that are usually ignored or taken for granted, such as establishing civil control over the military, delineating the relation between national and sub-national governments, and creating a viable system of bargaining between interest intermediaries.
6. Which, in turn, implies that consolidologists will have to deal not only with identifying and measuring legal rules and empirical patterns of behavior, but also with evaluating whether these rules/patterns correspond to the normative expectations of (most) citizens. In other words, consolidologists may find it difficult to avoid contentious issues involving **the quality of democracy**, i.e. its legitimacy as well as its longevity.

SUB-CONCLUSION

The major implication of the preceding discussion is that **no single set of institutions/rules (and, least of all, no single institution or rule) defines political democracy.**^{xxvii} Not even such prominent candidates as majority rule, territorial representation, competitive elections, parliamentary sovereignty, a popularly-elected executive or a "responsible party system" can be taken as its distinctive hallmark. Needless to say, this is a serious debility when it comes to measuring CoD. One cannot just seize on some key "meta-relation," such as the manner of forming executive power, trace its transformation into a valued institution, and assume that all the others, the party system, the decision-rules, etc., will co-vary with it or fall into line once a presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential regime has been established and crossed some critical threshold of mutual acceptance. What must be analyzed is an emerging network of relationships involving multiple processes and sites. It may not be difficult to agree on what Robert Dahl has called "the procedural minimum" without which no democracy could be said to exist (secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational freedom, executive accountability), but underlying these accomplishments and flowing from them are much more subtle and complex relations which define both the substance and form of nascent democratic regimes. It is important that elections be held, that parties compete with varying chances of winning, that voter preferences be secretly recorded and honestly counted, that governments be formed by some pre-established process, that associations be free to form, recruit members and exercise influence, that citizens be allowed to contest the policies of their government and hold leaders responsible for their actions. The longer these structures and rules of the "procedural minimum" exist, the greater is the likelihood they will persist. Polities that have had regular elections of uncertain outcome for, say, forty years are more likely to continue having them in the future than is a polity which has only had them for, say, ten years -- and so forth down the line. Therefore, it is probably correct, *ceteris paribus*, to assume that Italian democracy is more consolidated than either Portuguese or Spanish democracy.

But the sheer "longevity" of such rules is an inadequate base upon which to build an understanding of CoD. For one thing, it doesn't tell us much about **why** or **how** they have persisted. It just records the fact *ex post*. A more serious accusation is that such an approach tends to privilege one set of democratic institutions (usually, political parties and elections) and reifies (not to say, fetishizes) their presence at the expense of others. It could even lead to adopting a historically or culturally peculiar outcome as the standard against which to measure the progress of contemporary neo-democracies. The obvious danger is to consider popular election of the chief executive and competition between two centrist "catch-all" parties as the norm for institutions, and rotation in exclusive responsibility for government as the hallmark of success -- i.e. to apply the U.S. model to evaluate what is happening in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. Whatever metric one applies, it must be capacious enough to capture the emergence of a much wider range of possible types of democracy.

ASSESSING THE MACRO-IMPACT OF THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND PROTECTION EFFORT

At this point, we seem to have all the necessary empirical material for assessing the aggregate impact of DPP upon democratization during the period from 1980-99: multiple indicators of DPP Effort (DPPE) and separate scales for liberalization (LoA), transition (MoT) and consolidation (CoD) for the eleven countries in our sample. What we now need is an opposite strategy for analyzing this material comparatively and a plausible basis for inferring causality from whatever patterns of association we find.

However, as we discussed at the outset, our expectation has always been paradoxical. We do **not** expect to find a positive and significant direct correlation between the DPP effort and progress toward LoA and CoD and, if we find such a correlation, our inference would be that it is spurious.^{xxviii} In other words, we would interpret this to mean that donors had deliberately “cherry-picked,” i.e. chosen to give democracy assistance to countries that they knew (or suspected) would have in any case been successful in liberalizing their autocracies and/or consolidating their neo-democracies.

Our working hypothesis has been that DPP’s impact will only be marginal (but potentially significant) and positive:

the aggregate effort (DPPE) – measured in monetary terms – by all DPP donors and DPP programs in a given country is likely to have a net effect on the success of democratization, but only once other more significant domestic factors have been taken into account.

In other words, if we simply add all the DPP contributions together (with and without controlling for variation in the size of recipient countries), ignore the identity and mix of donors, set aside the content of the programs and projects involved, pay no attention to the timing and sequence with which they were

disbursed, and presume that there are no differences in overhead costs and the efficiency of actual disbursements – we should still be able to discern a **positive net effect** upon both the extent to which recipients’ liberalize their previously autocratic regimes (in MENA) or consolidate their newly founded democratic regimes (in CEE) – but only **after** taking into account a number of structural and situational factors. To a limited extent, we can also look into the possible macro-impact of variation in donors and programmes at the national level, but a convincing evaluation of these more detailed factors will depend on our ability to follow up with comparative analyses of specific programmes and projects at the meso- and micro-levels.^{xxix}

This strategy of inference implies that our data-gathering so far has been insufficient. We need to introduce in some systematic fashion a set of control variables. These would measure conditions that might have contributed independently to the success of liberalization, transition and/or consolidation – and it is only after assessing their impact on outcomes that we will be able to test for the marginal contribution of the DPPE.^{xxx} Fortunately, there exists an abundant literature on the so-called “pre-requisites” or “facilitating conditions” for democracy and it should be possible to manipulate data on them in such a way as to predict how easy or difficult it was likely to be to produce a successful outcome.^{xxxi} Once we introduce variables to control for those characteristics that allegedly favor such successes, our estimate of the contribution of DPP to the outcome will have diminished – although we do anticipate some enduring (and positive) effect.

Of course, we might even discover the inverse. The independent contribution of DPP could be significant, but negative. In this case, our initial suspicion of spuriousness would be inverted. Instead of “cherry-picking” the easy cases, donors might have been “basket-casing,” i.e. concentrating their effort on those cases where impediments to liberalization and/or democratization were most likely to emerge.

Needless to say, if these economic, social and cultural variables cannot be combined into a statistically significant model that predicts the subsequent

course of regime change in CEE and MENA, the potential for a positive contribution by DPP would be considerably enhanced, but not proven. It still remains possible that other variables, especially ones intrinsic to the process of democratization itself, determined the outcome – whether or not the actors involved in making these “transitional” choices received any support from foreign donors.

TRACKING THE DIRECT IMPACT OF DPP EFFORT

Table 1: Correlation Matrix of DPP Measures and Scales of Democratization

Scales of Democratization

Measures of DPP	TDS	LoA + CoD	TDS(W)
Total DPP In US\$ mil. (1980-99)	+.421 (.225)	+.431 (.214)	+.419 (.228)
Total DPP In US\$ per capita (1980-99)	+.604 (.064)	+.572 (.084)	+.642 (.046)
Total DPP logged In US\$, (1980-99)	+.619 (.056)	+.579 (.080)	+.612 (.060)

N=10

In Table 1 are displayed the Pearson Product Moment Correlations and 2-tailed significance tests between three indicators of DPPE and three indicators of the cumulative progress that ten of the eleven countries in CEE+MENA made toward the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime from 1980 to 1999.^{xxxii} It will be immediately noticed that all of the coefficients are positive. In other words, **the more in absolute, logged or per capita terms a country was given in democracy assistance, the further that country tended to advance on our three Scales of Democratization.**^{xxxiii} This relation was less significant for the absolute and the logged amounts than when the DPP

effort was controlled for the size of country's population. The unweighted cumulative scores of all three processes (TDS) hardly differed from the sum of just the liberalization and the consolidation scales (LoA+CoD) and, hence, the correlations were virtually identical. Interestingly, the two scores weighted by their relative difficulty of acquisition -- TDS(W) -- proved to be predicted to about the same extent as the simple cumulative scores, except for per capita DPP where the weighted one was a significantly better predictor.^{xxxiv}

Using the sum total of DPP from 1980 to 1999 in US\$, all the relationships were statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of each country's population, the coefficient became considerably more significant, even reaching the magic $>.05$ level in the case of TDS(W). Logging the total DPPE produces a positive but less statistically significant result.

This is **not** what we expected. Not even the most enthusiastic proponent of DPP has argued that it alone is capable of ensuring either liberalization or a successful consolidation. The amounts have been manifestly too modest and the advice, however good, still had to compete with "domestic priorities and values" in the receiving countries. Our first suspicion, therefore, is that DPP promoters could be accused of "cherry-picking." The results are consistent with a strategy of giving a priority to those recipients that were likely to do well anyway so that the donors would look good to their funding sources "back home." Inversely, at this aggregate level, i.e. with both CEE and MENA cases (minus Palestine), there is no evidence that they preferred those countries which one might have expected (and subsequently had) the greatest difficulty in democratizing themselves.

However, when we split the data into two samples – one for CEE with six countries and one for MENA with four – the accusation of "cherry-picking" becomes radically less compelling. Figure 1 with its scatterplot of the DDP per capita X TDS(W) shows why. What we have captured is simply the two core differences between CEE and MENA, namely: (1) that the former countries have received more DPP per capita over the period (from \$8.23 in Poland to \$28.2 in Bulgaria) than the latter (from \$0.15 in Algeria to \$2.84 in Egypt); and (2) that the

former have progressed through the transition well into consolidation, whereas, the latter countries are still mired in hesitant processes of liberalization. As we can see from Tables 2 & 3, when we examine the distribution of DPP within the two regions, we no longer find any evidence at all that more was given to successful countries.

Table 2: THE MACRO-IMPACT OF DPPE: CEE ONLY
Scales of Democratization

Measures of DPPE	TDS	LoA + CoD	TDS(W)
Total DPP in US\$ (1980-99)	-.225 (.668)	+.052 (.922)	-.306 (.555)
Per Capita DPP (1980-99)	-.029 (.956)	-.305 (.555)	+.096 (.856)
DPP logged (1980-99)	-.327 (.526)	-.064 (.904)	-.401 (.430)

N=6

In CEE, the direction of many of the correlations has even changed from positive to negative, but the major finding is that none of them are remotely close to significant. Based on the simple bi-variate relation between DDPE and our scales of regime change, there is neither evidence that it contributed directly to regime change, nor that donors systematically picked winners or losers. The impression in CEE is simply that of randomness.

Table 3: THE MACRO-IMPACT OF DPPE: MENA ONLY
Scales of Democratization

Measures of DPPE	TDS	LoA + CoD	TDS(W)
Total DPP in US\$ (1980-99)	-.266 (.734)	-.480 (.531)	+ .328 (.672)
Per Capita DPP in US\$ (1980-99)	+.217 (.783)	-.469 (.520)	-.321 (.679)
Total DPP In US\$ logged (1980-99)	+.132 (.869)	-.101 (.899)	+ .062 (.938)

N=4

In Table 3, we find a quite similar picture for the smaller MENA sub-set. The coefficients are positive, but utterly insignificant. DPP (in much smaller amounts except for Palestine which has not been included) went neither to those recipients who liberalized more or those who liberalized less. For example, Turkey was the only country in the region that made any progress toward consolidating democracy and it received much less DPP than Egypt (23.77 million US\$ compared to 189.13 million US\$) and both have about the same population (65.7 million inhabitants compared to 66.7).

What makes this finding especially compelling is that, unlike a random division of variance for which the two sets should have approximately the same means, these two sets almost do not overlap with each other – the exception being Turkey. Finding the same (non-) significance implies that the relation of DPP to the process of regime change holds constant for both its liberalization and its democratization “phases” and holds across units at very different levels of development. Moreover, it holds for two subsets of countries with quite different political histories and cultural heritages.

We can also partition our data to address another controversial issue in the democracy assistance literature: Is DPP given by the EU and European countries more or less effective than that given by the United States – at least, at the macro-level? Several articles have suggested that their greater “local knowledge” (and secrecy in the case of the German party foundations) makes the former perform more effectively.^{xxxv} One might also add that, given the fact that all of the CEE countries in our sample are on the list of front-runners for membership in the EU, Western Europeans have a potentiality for exercising political conditionality that the Americans do not. Regardless of the sums that they spend, the mere threat that failure to produce a liberal democratic outcome will exclude the recipients from entry into the EU club provides a powerful incentive to conform.

Table 4: THE MACRO-IMPACT OF EUROPEAN DPP UPON DEMOCRATIZATION
Scales of Democratization (CEE+MENA)

Measures of DPPE by Europe	TDS	LoA + CoD	TDS(W)
Total DPP In US\$ (1980-99)	+0.674 (.032)	+0.719 (.019)	+0.672 (.033)
Total DPP In US\$ per capita (1980-99)	+0.773 (.009)	+0.739 (.015)	+0.804 (.005)
Total DPP In US\$ logged (1980-99)	+0.809 (.005)	+0.792 (.006)	+0.802 (.005)
N = 10			

Table 5: THE MACRO-IMPACT OF US DPP UPON DEMOCRATIZATION
Scales of Democratization (CEE+MENA)

Measures of DPPE by USA	TDS	LoA + CoD	TDS(W)
Total DPP In US\$ mil. (1980-99)	+ .193 (.593)	+ .179 (.621)	+ .191 (.597)
Total DPP In US\$ per capita (1980-99)	+ .458 (.183)	+ .430 (.215)	+ .496 (.145)
Total DPP In US\$ logged (1980-99)	+ .510 (.132)	+ .467 (.174)	+ .504 (.138)

N = 10

Juxtaposing Tables 4 & 5 and including both CEE and MENA, there is some evidence that “the Europeans do it better,” but it will only later be discernable whether this is because they have been better at assessing who would have done well anyway or because their DPP really has been better placed or more efficiently administered. As was the case with Table 1, the correlations are positive for both “camps of donors.” They are, however, higher and more significant for the Europeans in every category. As before, the weighted cumulative scale is best predicted by the DPP indicators with an astonishingly high correlation of .804 (.005) between European per capita aid and TDS(W). We may, of course, subsequently discover that this is spurious when we control for the other factors that predict success in regime change. It is important, however, to note that the putative superiority of Euro-DPP is not due to its concentration on the CEE countries. In fact, the US was a larger contributor to four of these six recipients (Poland and the Czech Republic were

the exceptions). The Europeans gave more DPP money to Morocco, Algeria and Palestine than the United States.^{xxxvi} Whether, however, they should be castigated for picking those cherries that are easier to reach or congratulated for helping to produce a better *tarte aux cerises* remains to be seen.

CREATING A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION WITHOUT DPPE

Now, having examined the direct relation between DPP and LoA & CoD, we can get down to the more serious and challenging business of trying to build a model that predicts the likelihood of successful liberalization-transition-democratization and, then, discovering whether the absolute, per capita or logged amounts of DPP differs (positively or negatively) from the expectations established by this model. Specifying such a model with so few and such diverse countries is not going to be an easy task. As mentioned previously, the political science literature has produced long lists of alleged prerequisites for democracy, far too many to be tested simultaneously with the ten cases that we have available. Upon closer inspection, these variables can be separated into no less than five theoretical clusters: (1) “structural;” (2) “cultural;” (3) “realist or geo-strategic;” (4) “stateness;” and (5) “transitological.” Each has a mutually exclusive set of causal or enabling conditions and is capable of generating its own distinctive predictions concerning the probable outcome.^{xxxvii}

Structural Variables

Let us begin with a standard list of allegedly favorable structural conditions obtaining at the moment of departure and see how well indicators of them predict the subsequent course of LoA and CoD. These are:

1. Estimated GDP per capita – the higher the average income, the greater the probability of successful liberalization/consolidation.
2. Human Development Index – the higher the quality of life prior to regime change, the greater the probability of successful LoA & CoD.
3. Income Distribution – the more egalitarian the distribution, the greater the probability of successful LoA & CoD.

4. Rate of Economic Growth – the higher the growth rate before and/or after the initiation of regime change, the greater the probability of successful LoA & CoD.

Table 6: Correlation Matrix of Structural Variables and Democratization Scales

Structural Variables	Scales of Democratization	
	TDS	TDS(W)
GDP per Capita (1990)	+ .709 (.022)	+ .771 (.009)
Human Development Index (1990)	+ .837 (.003)	+ .913 (.000)
Gini Index of Income Distribution	- .372 (.289)	- .399 (.253)
Rate of Economic Growth (1990-99)	+ .165 (.649)	+ .140 (.699)
GDP per Capita (1999)	+ .712 (.021)	+ .753 (.012)
Human Development Index (1999)	+ .750 (.012)	+ .833 (.003)
Government Revenue as % GDP (1990)	+ .736 (.015)	+ .765 (.010)
Government Revenue as % GDP (1999)	+ .517 (.131)	+ .556 (.095)

N = 10

Even a quick glance at Table 6 demonstrates that some of the structural variables that are suspected to “cause” or “facilitate” democratization are indeed significantly correlated with this outcome and their signs run in the anticipated direction. For example, Gross Domestic Product per capita at the beginning of the period (1990) is positively correlated with the total democratization scale at a quite significant level: +.709 (.022) and even more closely correlated with the weighted scale: +.771 (.009). The correlations are virtually identical at the end of the period (1999) The UNDP’s Human Development Index does better than both in 1990: +.837 (.003) and only slightly less well in 1999: +.750 (.012). And, again, the correlation with TDS(W) is higher. Surprisingly from a strictly “liberal” point of view, the share of government revenues in GDP (1990) is also a good predictor of later success: +.736 (.015) with TDS and +.765 (.010) with TDS(W),

but this may be due to a “regional specificity,” i.e. the much higher value for this variable in CEE at point of departure. In any case, it had declined in magnitude and significance 10 years later: +.517 (.126) and +.556 (.095). The other two structural conditions – income distribution and rate of economic growth – were insignificant, although their signs were in the anticipated direction.^{xxxviii}

Once we partition the variance into our two regions, the correlations persist in terms of their signs (with one exception), but not their significance. Everything is less tightly related in MENA: GDP per capita, the HD Index and the rate of Economic Growth. Interestingly, the Gini Index of income inequality across deciles of the population is **positively** correlated with democratization in both CEE and MENA, rather than negatively when the entire sample is considered. In other words, the more unequal the distribution of income **within** both of the two regions at the start, the greater the likelihood of democracy at the end of the period – although in both subsets the correlation is not highly significant.

Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Structural Variables and Democratization Scales in CEE
Scales of Democratization

Structural Variables	TDS	TDS(W)
GDP per Capita (1990)	.661 (.153)	.745 (.089)
Human Dev't Index (1990)	.830 (.041)	.904 (.013)
Gini Index of Income Distribution	.137 (.795)	.032 (.952)
Rate of Economic Growth (1990-99)	.532 (.277)	.420 (.407)
GDP per Capita (1999)	.712 (.113)	.718 (.108)
Human Dev't Index (1999)	.786 (.064)	.767 (.075)
Gov't Revenue as % GDP (1990)	.399 (.433)	.484 (.330)
Gov't Revenue as % GDP (1999)	.176 (.739)	.305 (.557)

N = 6

Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Structural Variables and Democratization Scales in MENA

Scales of Democratization

Structural Variables	TDS	TDS(W)
GDP per Capita (1990)	+ .345 (.655)	+ .638 (.362)
Human Dev't Index (1990)	+ .309 (.691)	.607 (.393)
Gini Index of Income Distribution	+ .716 (.284)	+ .790 (.210)
Rate of Economic Growth (1990-99)	+ .325 (.675)	+ .421 (.579)

GDP per Capita (1999)	+ .097 (.903)	+ .422 (.578)
Human Dev't Index (1999)	.129 (.871)	+ .222 (.778)
Gov't Revenue as % GDP (1990)	- .309 (.691)	- .300 (.700)
Gov't Revenue as % GDP (1999)	- .225 (.775)	- .215 (.785)

N = 4

When we take the variables from Table 6, place them in an OLS multiple regression and eliminate those that contribute nothing to our ability to predict the outcome in terms of the simple or weighted total democratization score, we obtain the best fit by using the Human Development Index (1990) and the Rate of Economic Growth (1990-99), with the former contributing a lot and the latter very little. All of the other structural variables are eliminated. The problem in Table 9 is that HDI does too good a job – and that can safely be attributed to the fact that the communist regimes in CEE with their superior education and health systems did much better on this index than the capitalist (or, better, state-nationalist) regimes in MENA at comparable levels of economic development. Once, capitalism had arrived “in such a shocking manner” in the former, so did their relative performance on the HDI decline and, hence, its correlation with TDS and TDS(W).

Table 9: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ESTIMATE OF TDS AND TDS(W) USING BEST COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
HDI + GDP Growth	R =.847	R =.919
ANOVA		
GDP Growth	.	
Standardized beta	.132	.105
T	.657	.702
Sig.	.532	.505
HDI		
Standardized beta	.831	.909
t	4.135	6.104
Sig.	.004	.000

N = 10

This has led us to prefer a “second-best” strategy on the grounds that a less impressive, but nonetheless highly significant, indicator (GDP per capita) should be preferred on the grounds that the results obtained by using it are more likely to be universally valid, especially when entered into comparisons with fewer post-communist cases. Therefore, as we move toward a “consolidated” model, we will use it along with whatever we discover from the cultural, strategic and other variables.

Table 10: SECOND BEST COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
GDP per capita + GDP Growth	R =.715	R = .774
ANOVA		
GDP Growth		
Standardized beta	.093	.062
T	.351	.257
Sig.	.736	.804
GDP per capita		
Standardized beta	.700	.765
T	2.637	3.177
Sig.	.026	.016

N = 10

It should be noted that, as has usually been the case, the weighted indicator of democratization is better predicted than the simple cumulative one. Also, the level of GDP is a much more significant predictor of TDS and TDS (W) than the rate of its growth. The two countries whose accomplishments are least well predicted are Romania which did better than expected and Algeria which did worse.

CULTURAL VARIABLES

“Culturalist” explanations for the success of democratization abound, but are characteristically difficult to specify or to operationalize. Many authors have stressed the imperative of having a “civic culture” and even measured this in one well-known study by applying survey research in several settings in order to discover whether mass attitudes resembled those found in the two allegedly most successful cases, namely, the United Kingdom and the United States.^{xxxix} Needless to say, countries such as Italy and Germany failed to replicate this standard. Even so, their respective democracies persisted and, indeed, today there are no grounds for judging them markedly inferior to the UK or the USA. In any case, we do not have any such carefully crafted research that covers the cases that interest us here with attitudinal surveys.

Hence, we shall have to improvise. Below, we have specified three historical and relatively enduring conditions that might be expected to make it culturally easier or more difficult to consolidate a democratic regime:^{xl}

1. Years of previous democracy – the longer the prior experience with some form of democracy, the greater the probability of successful TDS & TDS(W).
2. Religious Homogeneity – the more that the society has a single dominant religion, the greater the probability of successful TDS & TDS(W).

- Ethnic/Linguistic Homogeneity – the more the society is dominated by a single ethno-linguistic group, the greater the probability of a higher TDS & TDS(W)score.

Table 11: Correlation Matrix of Cultural Variables and Democratization Scales

	TDS	TDS(W)
Years of Previous Democracy	-.052 (.886)	+.025 (.945)
Religious/ Homogeneity	-.605 (.064)	-.631 (.050)
Ethno-Linguistic Homogeneity	+.098 (.788)	-.045 (.901)

N = 10

Only one of these variables is correlated to a statistically significant degree within our eleven country sample, and its sign is **contrary to theoretical expectation**. The more the society is dominated by a single religion, the less likely it is that its polity will make progress toward democracy! Needless to say, it might have been more interesting to test for the identity of that dominant religion, but that would simply split our sample into a (mostly) Catholic CEE and (thoroughly) a Muslim MENA. With a larger number of societies and a greater range of religious affiliations, we might eventually be able to test for the alleged propensity for the more “Westernized” and secularized Christian societies to be more democratic than either “Easternized” Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Confucianism.

Those with a longer previous history of democracy and greater ethno-linguistic homogeneity did do better, but only very marginally so among our ten cases. Whether this “non-finding” – which goes very much against the literature -- holds up in a larger sample of neo-democracies is, of course, another matter.

Realistic or Geo-Strategic Variables

The next set of theorists who have had something to say about democratization come from the so-called “realist” school of international relations. All of the following are alleged to be associated with a more prominent location on the security agenda of donor countries and, hence, likely to attract higher

relative DPP and greater concern with the resulting democratic outcome. The underlying assumption, repeatedly stressed by former US President Bill Clinton, is that “democracies do not go to war with each other.” This desirable end from the perspective of well-established democracies should vary with:

1. Proximity to the Europe: measured by the distance from the national capital to Bruxelles
2. Proximity to the United States: measured by the distance from the national capital to Washington, DC.
3. Special security situation: as measured by the country’s importance as a raw material supplier (esp. petroleum), by the presence or absence of civil conflict or internal war (esp. one that involves neighboring states), or by its geo-strategic location (esp. presence of foreign military base or prospect for refugees)
4. Level of Previous Western Fixed Foreign Investment
5. Proportion of Imports from & Exports to Western countries

It should be noted that several of these variables would require some “artful” transformations since, in some situations, the “realist” assessment places much higher priority on political stability of any kind and, hence, may lead to no DPP at all if that would endanger the perpetuation of compliant autocracies (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Algeria). Moreover, it is precisely because potential donors may not agree on the nature of the threat/opportunity posed by the international system that they may disagree in their willingness to engage in a DPP effort, or may decide to compete with each other in doing so.

Table 12: Correlation Matrix of Strategic Variables and Scales of Democratization

Strategic Variables	TDS	TDS(W)
Distance from Bruxelles	-.652 (.041)	-.667 (.035)
Distance from Washington	-.265 (.459)	-.183 (.612)
Exports&Imports as % GDP (1990)	+.374 (.287)	+.406 (.244)

N = 10

We have only been able to operationalize three of these variables at this point and only one of them looks highly promising from the results in Table 12: namely, distance to Bruxelles. The closer the national capital of a neo-democracy is to the site of the EU, the more likely is it to have made progress toward consolidating its regime. Distance to Washington, D.C. is much less significant and the extent of integration into the world economy (as measured by exports and imports as a % of GDP) is only slightly less insignificant.

‘STATENESS’ VARIABLES

There has been a renewed concern with the impact of “stateness” upon processes of regime change, as expressed most forcefully and recently in the book by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan on Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.^{xli} The underlying theme dates back to a (belatedly) influential article by Dankwert Rustow who argued that there was only one pre-requisite for democracy: “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” and this, in the contemporary age, means that they must be organized into a economically viable and territorially unique state.^{xlii} Needless to say, there are no ready-made operational indicators of “stateness” and we have already seen that ethnic-national homogeneity alone is no guarantor or even correlate of successful democratization. We have not yet been able to assemble the necessary data, but the following indicators might be capable of capturing

variation in the context of stateness once the previous autocracy has fallen or transformed itself:

1. Change in central government revenue as a % of GDP once liberalization or democratization has begun.
2. Years during which the unit has continuously enjoyed external recognition, i.e. has been a member of the United Nations.
3. Code for State-building in the context of regime change:
 - 1 = No change in either external or internal borders.
 - 2 = No external, some internal border changes
 - 3 = Contestation about external borders, but no change in them.
 - 4 = Peaceful change in external borders.
 - 5 = Violent conflict over appropriateness of borders leads to change in them.

'TRANSITOLOGICAL' VARIABLES

Finally, the recent and burgeoning literature sometimes referred to as 'transitology' has tended to focus on the peculiar conditions and choices made during the highly uncertain period between one regime and another with the assumption that these momentary balances of power and improvised solutions to immediate problems can have long lasting effects on both the likelihood that some form of democracy will be consolidated and the quality of that democracy.

The following conditions might be expected to affect these outcomes:

1. Mode of Transition (in order of promoting a favorable outcome):
 - 1 = pacted between ancien régime and its opponents
 - 2 = imposed by ancien régime
 - 3 = reformist, generated by peaceful mass mobilization from below
 - 4 = revolutionary, brought about by violent insurrection from below
 - 5 = 'black hole,' some indeterminate and confused mix of the above

2. Timing of Transition: years since this 'wave of democratization' began in 1974

3. Regional context:

1 = all neighboring regimes are established democracies

2 = some neighbors are established, some neo-democracies

3 = all neighboring regimes are neo-democracies

4 = some neighbors are neo-democracies, some liberalized autocracies

5 = all neighboring regimes are autocracies of some type or another

4. Regional Organization:

1 = Country is early candidate for EU membership

2 = Country is a candidate for later EU membership

3 = Country is already or is a candidate for associate status with EU

4 = Country has no foreseeable link to EU but is involved in some regional IGO with a proclaimed commitment to democracy, e.g. OAS, OAU

5 = Country has no significant political links to a regional IGO with democratic objectives, e.g. ASEAN, League of Arab States

5. Type of Previous Autocracy:

1 = bureaucratic authoritarian

2 = traditional monarchy

3 = populist authoritarian

4 = 'partialitarian' or degenerate communist/totalitarian

5 = totalitarian/communist

Again, we have not had the time or resources to gather or code these data, but intend to do so in the future.

* * *

Since it is by no means clear which of these models (if any) DPP donors might have had in mind to guide their “cherry-picking” (or what signals they may have used to trigger their “basket-casing”), all that we can do is to try to construct the best possible predictive model from the indicators we have so far assembled. Now that we have explored each of them separately, it is time to combine them in multiple regression equations and eliminate those variables that make no contribution to our ability to predict the subsequent course of liberalization/democratization. It is only after having examined the predictive validity of these differing sets of assumptions that we can turn to the task of estimating the direction and significance of the independent contribution of DPP.

ESTIMATING A MULTI-VARIATE EQUATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION
[WITH AND WITHOUT DPP]

We now have a rich list of “suspects.” The following have all been found to have been conducting significantly intimate bivariate relations with TDS and TDS(W): Human Development Index, GDP per capita, Religious Homogeneity (negative), and Distance from Bruxelles, Doubtless, some of the “Stateness” and “Transitological” variables might eventually contribute something – once we have measured them adequately. Opting for the ‘second best’ option, i.e. preferring economic to human development for the reasons advocated above, we come up with the following equation:

Table 13: MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING TDS AND TDS(W) USING THE (SECOND) BEST COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL, CULTURAL AND STRATEGIC VARIABLES

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
GDP per capita + Religious Homogeneity + Distance from Bruxelles	R = .736 R Square = .541	R = .784 R Square = .615
ANOVA	.171	.105
GDP per capita		
Standardized beta	.446	.580
t	.920	1.307
Sig.	.393	.239
Religious Homogeneity		
Standardized beta	-.098	-.066
t	-.226	-.165

Sig.	.829	.875
Distance from Bruxelles		
Standardized beta	-.253	-.190
t	-.591	-.483
Sig.	.576	.646

N = 10

A glance at the statistics reveals that all of these “finalists” did not make equally significant contributions to either TDS or TDS(W). Gross Domestic Product per capita alone is by far the most reliable “competitor.” The total estimate jumps only from .709 to .733 in the case of TDS and from .771 to .783 in the case of TDS(W) when the strategic variable is added and makes virtually no improvement with the religious variable. The proportion of variance predicted is quite high, but not so high as to preclude any effect for DPP. In terms of specific cases, the ones with the highest residuals, i.e. least well predicted, were Poland and Romania which did better than one might have expected and Algeria which did worse. Morocco also did better than it was “supposed to,” but still within the standard deviation.

Finally, we arrive at “the moment of truth” at which we can apply the most strenuous possible test for the (positive or negative) impact of DPPE on the macro-process of regime change from autocracy to democracy in CEE and MENA. In Tables 14-16, we find the results of our inserting the three DPPE variables into the previous “second best” equation.

Table 14: MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING TDS AND TDS(W) USING THE (SECOND) BEST COMBINATION AND TOTAL DPP

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
1. GDP per capita + Distance from Bruxelles +Total DPP	R = .821 R Square = .674	R = .867 R Square = .752
ANOVA	.066	.016
GDP per capita		
Standardized beta	.557	.672
t	1.582	2.193
Sig.	.165	.071
Distance from Bruxelles		
Standardized beta	-.185	-.113

t	-.522	-.365
Sig.	.620	.728
Total DPP		
Standardized beta	.375	.378
t	1.583	1.832
Sig.	.164	.117

Table 15: MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING TDS AND TDS(W) USING THE (SECOND) BEST COMBINATION AND LOGGED DPP

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
2. GDP per capita + Distance from Bruxelles + Total DPP	R = .866 R Square = .750	R = .895 R Square = .801
(constant)		
GDP per capita		
Standardized beta	.340	.465
t	1.078	1.654
Sig.	.323	.149
Distance from Bruxelles		
Standardized beta	-.326	-.251
t	-1.059	-.916
Sig.	.330	.395
Logged DPP		
Standardized beta	.479	.450
t	2.257	2.380
Sig.	.065	.055

N = 10

Table 16: MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING TDS AND TDS(W) USING THE (SECOND) BEST COMBINATION AND DPP PER CAPITA

Equations	TDS	TDS(W)
3. GDP per capita + Distance from Bruxelles + DPP per capita	R = .763 R Square = .583	R = .813 R Square = .660
(constant)		
GDP per capita		
Standardized beta	.360	.473
T	.831	1.209
Sig.	.438	.272
Distance from Bruxelles		
Standardized beta	-.255	-.183
t	-.642	-.511

Sig.	.544	.628
DPP per capita		
Standardized beta	.266	.271
T	.806	.910
Sig.	.451	.398

N = 10

And the findings are surprising and convincing! **On all three measures, DPP contributes positively to both the simple and weighted scales of democratization.** Despite the fact that in Table 1 the per capita measure was most significant in predicting the extent of regime change, once the controls have been added, it is the absolute and, especially, the logged measures that win hands down. The larger the total sum of DPP a country received, the greater was its progress toward liberalization or consolidation likely to have been – not more significant than having a higher GDP per capita, but definitely more than just being nearer to Bruxelles. But the most astonishing finding is in Table 15 in which the log of total DPP has become **the most significant** predictor of such progress and at the .065 level for TDS and the .055 level for TDS(W)! It even displaces GDP per capita in relative importance and the distance to Bruxelles literally evaporates as a contributor. So, for the moment we can say that **DPP when distributed in a certain fashion does seem to produce a positive effect – and that irregardless of the stage of regime change or differences in cultural/historical context.** Given the “most different systems” nature of our comparative design – one in which CEE and MENA are clustered at the opposite ends of a continuum with only Turkey in between -- this makes the finding especially compelling from a theoretical perspective, even if its statistical basis is not very “robust.”

Moreover, this finding -- that it is the total and logged amounts of DPP that are particularly significant, not the per capita amounts -- has potentially important policy implications. It doesn't seem to make sense to divide DPP funds evenly or calibrate them according to the size of a country's population. What counts apparently is the ability to assemble a critical mass of financial support. Only then can it have a discernable and positive impact, regardless of the absolute

number of beneficiaries or magnitude of the problem. The fact that it is the logged rather than the total amount that is even more significantly associated with both TDS and TDS(W) suggests (but does not prove) that there are diminishing marginal returns to DPP and that it is not necessarily the “big ticket items” that have the greatest impact.^{xliii}

Since our sample is too small to estimate separately and reliably the slope, i.e. the beta coefficient, for CEE and MENA, we can only speculate about the discrete impact of DPP upon liberalization among the former countries and consolidation among the latter. The fact that the MENA four received significantly less support (except for Palestine, the outlier) and made less progress leads us to propose that DPP is better at protecting democracy than at promoting it in the first place. Which is not to say that that its contribution has been irrelevant in the former instance since both sub-sets seem to have received a significant positive boost from DPP funding.

Striking as they are, these findings are tentative and may well “evaporate” when similar tests are performed on larger samples. CEE and MENA do make an odd “pair” in that they have been engaged in different aspects of the complex process of regime change – very rapid transition and consolidation in the case of the former and hesitant liberalization and very little evidence of transition among the latter. Turkey does provide the “missing link” between the two samples and, interestingly enough, its score on TDS and TDS(W) is well predicted by the final multiple regression equations. It is not an outlier and this is encouraging in terms of future research which will almost certainly “discover” many other polities crowded into that difficult “transitional” space between liberalization and democratization. The real test will come, not just when we insert other contextual and situational variables into the existing sample, but when its number and range of variation is enlarged to include such challenging cases at the republics of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia – not to mention Albania.

CONCLUDING WITH SOME DOUBTS

Ultimately, what counts for the future of these neo-democracies is their **legitimacy**. This may well be where the contribution of DPP is most problematic since virtually none of its program and projects can be demonstrably shown to contribute positively to such an outcome and there is even the suspicion that the intervention of foreign agents may undermine long-term regime legitimacy in the eyes of its national citizens.

Moreover, legitimacy has proven notoriously difficult to measure empirically. We can presume that a fully consolidated democracy is more likely to persist over time, but this could be the product of habit, inertia or the lack of an alternative. It is the quality of democracy – not its consolidation as a set of rules – that is likely to have the determining influence on legitimacy and, hence, on the regime's presumptive capacity to persist when faced by serious exogenous challenges or dramatic endogenous declines in performance. The presence of legitimacy, however, is usually inferred from what does **not** occur, rather than what can be directly observed or who has directly benefited. Whenever and wherever certain forms of collective violence, resistance or struggle do **not** manifest themselves -- i.e. whenever or wherever resourceful and conflictful protagonists agree to play by established rules rather than try to eliminate each other from contention, or whenever and wherever subordinates defer without a fight to the commands of "superior" rulers -- we tend to assume that the democratic regime must be legitimate and, hence, that its quality must be satisfactory according to the prevailing standards of that citizenry.

We would concede that this is not a very satisfactory state of affairs from the point of view of normative democratic theory. It can mask the hegemony of "pre-political" forces of social and economic oppression. It can fail to disclose the manipulative effects of mass media. It may be more a product of resignation and apathy than of respect for the decisions of authorities or the political rights of fellow citizens. But it is still a safer base for inference than relying on the opinions of those theorists and intellectuals who are inevitably

disappointed that the advent of neo-democracy has not brought along with it all the qualities that they had hoped for.

* ENDNOTES *

ⁱ One could add: (4) Improving quality of democracy - understood here as expanding the democratic process beyond its core 'procedural' elements

ⁱⁱ On the fundamental different nature of consolidation of democracy see Philippe C. Schmitter, Nicolas Guilhot, "De la transition a la consolidation. Une lecture retrospective des *democratization studies*", to be published in the *Revue Française de Science Politique*. Also available in an English version under the title: "From Transition to Consolidation: Extending the Concept of Democratization and the Practice of Democracy", 1999

ⁱⁱⁱ It might be worthwhile stressing that the "rule of law" is not democratic per se: to become so, it must include equal citizenship rights and not be limited to the securing of property rights or free circulation of capital.

^{iv} The way the term contagion is used here differs from the way we have used it before. See Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context Upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies", in Whitehead (1996)

^v Similarly the analytical distinction between inside and outside the target for the primary location of activity is not as neat as represented in the table

^{vi} See for exmple David Hulme, Michael Edwards (eds.), *NGOs, States and Donors : Too Close for Comfort?*, New York : St Martin's Press, 1997; **Wood [1997] [NG]**

^{vii} Stephen Golub, "Assessing and Enhancing the Impact of Democratic Development Projects: A Practitioner's Perspective", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 1993, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 54 – 70

^{viii} Robinson (1996), p. iii

^{ix} ISA Consult (1997)

^x Robinson (1996)

^{xi} The "Announcement Effect"

^{xii} Later, we anticipate extending the use of this scale to instances in other world-regions where democratization has recently been accomplished or is currently under way. Presumably, this monitoring device could be used to score the performance of earlier democratizing countries in North America and Western Europe, even though we remain deeply skeptical about the "universality" of applying such indicators across time periods when they have quite different meanings and references for the actors involved.

^{xiii} Actually, the techniques of analysis that we will apply permit us to engage in "fuzzy" measurement by assigning less than dichotomous judgements, although we did encourage the coder-experts to try to come up with a yes/no answer.

^{xiv} There is one liberalization item missing from our list that has recently received a lot of attention in the literature, namely, “protection of minority rights.” As awareness grew that regime change could exacerbate ethno-linguistic and religious conflicts, observers began to conclude that constitutional/legal provisions guaranteeing the autonomous status and resources of minority groups might be called for. Leaving aside the persistent tension, in principle, between the traditional liberal emphasis on individualistic and universalistic rights and the claims by specific groups for collective rights and exemptions (Offe article), the fact that, in practice, the polities that concern us have very different social compositions and sensitivities to this issue lead us not to include this item.

^{xv} Actually, a more specific hypothesis would be: By time that liberalization on all seven items has been accomplished, there is a high probability that the polity will **already** have entered into its transition to democracy.

^{xvi} General citations on Freedom House and other democratization indicators making the observation that the sheer fact that so many of them are highly correlated with each other is **not** proof that they are accurate, but may reflect generic problems that they share when it comes to measuring such complex and controversial properties. “The most common claim for the validity of democratic performance measures is based on high statistical correlations with other such measures. (...) Yet highly correlated measures may all contain the same errors, all ‘share similar biases’, or all be determined by outside influences that may render their close association spurious. The correlations cannot therefore guarantee that the different measures are all quantifying the same underlying value or concept (...) and hence cannot prove their validity” (Cf. Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, *Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance: an Empirical and Conceptual Critique*, *Political Studies*, 48, 4, 759-87, p. 769).

As a "citation to African critique" : According to Dean E. Mc Henry Jr. in an examination of five datasets used in the study of democracy in Africa, “neither the reasonableness of the measures’ construction, nor the high degree of inter-correlation among the measures constitutes an empirical test, that is, based upon observations of events indicative of democracy in individual countries.” Thus, “the work of area scholars is important to quantitative specialists not only to facilitate an interpretation of quantitative data, but also to reconstruct the foundation for quantitative work.” (Cf. Mc Henry, Dean E. Jr., 2000, *Quantitative Measures of Democracy in Africa: An Assessment*, *Democratization*, 7, 2, 168-85, p. 171 and 183).

As for "some examples of work that has used the FH Index" : Among recent works that have used the FH index we might signal: Tatu Vanhanen, 2000, A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998, *Journal of Peace Research*, 37, 2, 251-265; André Blais and Agnieszka Dobrzynska, 1998, Turnout in electoral democracies, *European Journal of Political Research*, 33, 2, 239-261.

^{xviii} Adam Przeworski, "Some problems in the study of transition to democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Vol. III, (Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 57-61.

^{xix} After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970)

^{xx} Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Democracy, 1999), p. 85,87.

^{xxi} “The idea of a sequence of democratization from political opening to electoral transition to democratic consolidation certainly resembles some currents of scholarly work on democratization that began to burgeon in the mid-1980s, particularly the work by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and others on the transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America. (...) But the actual direct influence of the scholarly work on democratization on the core strategy -or on democracy aid generally over the past fifteen years- has been low” (id., p. 93).

^{xxii} Our article

^{xxiii} O'Donnell & Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions, pp. 7-8. Also Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratic theory and neocorporatist Practice," (Florence: European University Working Paper, No. 74, 1983).

^{xxiv} OK, I am responsible -- article

^{xxv} For a fascinating argument that it is often the "silences" and "abeyances" of constitutions -- their unwritten components -- that are most significant, see Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions. Gaps, 'Abeyances' and Political Temperament in the Maintenance of Government (London: Routledge, 1989).

^{xxvi} Not all cases of regime change will have to produce *ex novo* the full range of partial regimes for the simple reason that it is just possible that the previous autocracy or an even longer period of political history will have already produced an agreement on rules that is not called into question during the transition. For example, in most of the case in Central Eastern Europe, civilian control over the military had been institutionalized during by the Communist regime (with the ambiguous exception of Poland) and was not the object of particular attention -- at least, not until NATO membership became an issue. Similarly in Spain, it was believed (until the *golpe* of February 1981) that Franco had successfully cured the military of its propensity to intervene in politics. In the earlier cases in Southern Europe (again, with the exception of Spain) and Latin America, the internal borders and distribution of tasks between different levels of government seemed initially not to be controversial -- until external actors came along with their mantra about decentralization.

^{xxviii} This may be a "first" in empirical social science. One is always testing for the "null hypothesis" that the operative variables are not related to each other, but it is very rare that the analyst is pre-disposed to reject a significant correlation, if and when it emerges from the data-set.

^{xxix} This "macro" approach is quite different from the myriad of efforts at evaluating the impact of specific DPP programs and projects. The indicators and estimators are quantitative, but they are based on theories of democratization, not numerical measures related to the activities or (allegedly) discrete effects of such programs or projects. Moreover, thanks to its theoretical grounding, it is possible for us to stipulate plausible counter-factuals, i.e. how a given county might have performed without DPP, and therefore to estimate its marginal contribution. Of course, any findings at this level tell us nothing about which specific programs or projects worked well -- only that a certain "package" of spending by different donors over a lengthy period of time seems to have produced a positive or negative effect across a sub-set of countries. In fact, it is logically possible that none of the programs/projects worked as intended and that it was only the overall volume of resources injected into the regime change process that produced the observed effect.

^{xxx} Actually, the issue is a bit more complicated. We are not just interested in the extent to which national and international variables "retrodict" the course of the democratization process -- independently of DPP -- but also the extent to which donors might have "predicted" eventual success and adjusted their strategies to conform to it. Since we have no way of knowing which (if any) of these factors were present in the minds of donors, the best we can do is to presume that they were consciously or unconsciously influenced by the "prevailing wisdom" in the social sciences.

^{xxxi} There is a serious statistical problem, however. The number of potentially relevant variables greatly exceeds the number of cases -- even more so if we divide our variation in outcome into distinctive CEE and MENA subsets. All we can do is use multiple regression as a device for reducing variables that are insignificant -- even though this is bound to produce a less than "robust" solution.

^{xxxii} Palestine has been removed from the calculations, in part, because data on it are especially deficient since it is a "non-state" and, in part, because it is such an "outlier." At \$63.95, Palestinians received more than 10 times the average DPP per capita expenditures -- and they had the poorest record of performance on regime change for the period! Its inclusion (where possible) has a significant (if unique) effect on the

correlations between the per capita and logged measures of DPPE and both TDS and TDS(W). In effect, this exclusion amounts to a recognition that European and American DPP (and economic aid in general) to Palestine obeys a different logic.

^{xxxiii} The log of the total amount of DPP was used on the grounds of diminishing marginal utility or costs, i.e. a certain initial amount of support was necessary for virtually any DPP program regardless of the size of country, but beyond that “seed money” its impact might be expected to decline either because it became less expensive to extend it to larger numbers or because it was less likely to have an impact upon those receiving it.

^{xxxiv} In the subsequent analysis we have eliminated LoA + CoD since it performs no differently from the TDS scale. The correlation between the two is a very high .987 (.000).

^{xxxv} Cf. Ann Phillips, 1999, “Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in Central Eastern Europe”, *Democratization*, 6, 2, pp. 70-98; Stefan Mair, 2000, “Germany’s Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance: Comparative Advantages, New Challenges”, in Peter Burnell, ed., *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization*, London” Frank Cass, pp. 128-149..

^{xxxvi} One should observe that had Palestine not been removed from the calculations, the relative prowess of the Europeans might have suffered a considerable blow. They gave US\$106.70 million to Palestinians compared to America’s US\$78.11 million – and very little progress was made even toward liberalization, not to mention democratization.

^{xxxvii} For each model, we will reduce the number of operative variables to a maximum of four, given the restricted number of cases we are dealing with.

^{xxxviii} There is another “structural-cum-strategic” variable that might have contributed to predicting TDS or TDS(W) and that is Overseas Development Aid (ODA). According to this argument, democracy is best promoted not directly but indirectly by raising the level of economic development and foreign aid is the instrument to accomplish this. Leaving aside the fact that almost no one seems to be able to find any correlation between ODA and growth rates, our data show a negative (but not significant) correlation between this indicator and the democratization scales: -.498 (.143) with TDS and -.389 (.267) with TDS(W). On the absence of correlation between ODA and growth rates, see ...

^{xxxix} Cf. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, 1963, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Ronald Inglehart, 1997, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Cultural Change in 43 Societies*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

^{xl} We have chosen not to include in this analysis a fourth “cultural” variable on the grounds that it clusters too much within our two regional sub-samples. This is a “Good” colonial heritage, i.e. the more democratic and/or benevolent the previous colonial power (roughly in the following order: American>British>French>Dutch>Belgian>Austro-Hungarian>Ottoman>none at all), the greater the probability of successful democratization. Needless to say, in subsequent analyses with larger samples, it should be taken into account.

^{xli} Cf. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp 16-19. These authors also attach considerable importance to “nationhood” along with “stateness.” To the extent that being a nation is defined in terms of either ethnic and/or religious homogeneity, we have just learned about that the former has no significant correlation with democratization and the latter is significantly correlated with it – but in the direction opposite to the hypothesis. Again, these are the findings for a small number of cases from two quite distinct regions and they may not hold up in larger N and more comprehensive samples.

^{xlii} Cf. Dankwart Rustow, 1999, “Transitions to Democracy”, in Lisa Anderson, ed., *Transition to Democracy*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 26 (first published in *Comparative Politics*, 1970, 2, 3, pp. 337-365).

^{xliii} These findings do not allow us to infer anything about the impact that DPP has had at the meso- (i.e. program) level or at the micro- (i.e. project) level. The macro is never a simple aggregation of individual cases in the world of politics – that is the principal insight embedded in the notion of “the ecological fallacy.” There is every reason to believe that, hiding behind the complexity of total, logged and relative effect, there exist specific programs and projects of DPP that do make a quite significant contribution to either liberalization or democratization and do so without a predictable relation to their financial cost. There may even be instances of this that work successfully in otherwise quite different national and regional contexts. It will be our task in the second phase of this research to try to find out if this is true.